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ABSTRACT 
 
Security engineering is one of the important concerns during the system development and 
it should be addressed throughout the whole system development process. Besides, there 
are several languages for security modeling that help dealing with security risk 
management at the requirements stage. In this thesis, first of all, we are focusing on Event-
driven Process Chain (EPC), which is used during the business process modeling. More 
specifically, we investigate how this language supports information system security risk 
management (ISSRM). The purpose of this investigation is the problem of security 
requirements need of EPC. As a result, we obtain an alignment table between EPC 
constructs and ISSRM domain model concepts. Next, we extend the EPC language and its 
constructs with respect to the alignment table between EPC and ISSRM. As a 
consequence, we call the extended language as “Security-Oriented EPC”. The extended 
language contains new set of constructs which refer to ISSRM concepts. Lastly, after 
clarifying the importance of security requirements at the early system development, we 
present transformation guidelines to perform forward model translations from Security-
Oriented EPC to Mal-Activity Diagrams (MAD). During the transformation, our proposal 
is based on the systematic and grounded extensions of EPC language and its 
interdependency to the domain model of ISSRM. Alignment results may help business 
analysts understand how to model security risks at the system requirement and design 
stages. Also, transformation results pave the way for interoperability between the modeling 
languages that are analysed using the same conceptual framework.        
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are several established Business Process Modeling Languages (BPMLs) commonly 
used in industry (e.g. EPC [24] [25], BPMN [9], YAWL [8] and Activity Diagrams [6]). 
Usually to describe a business process, many forms of information must be integrated into 
a business process model. BPMLs differ in the extent to which their constructs represent 
the information that answers what is going to be done, who is going to do it, when and 
where it will be done, how and why will it be done, and who is dependent on the 
information. These differences result from the various source domains, and there is a need 
to secure entities and activities related to the above mentioned questions by implementing 
secure constructs. Work has not been done to align the business processes with Security 
Risk Management Model (SRM [11]). SRM can be addressed using different modeling 
techniques at different enterprise levels; asset level, risk level, and risk treatment level.  
 
1.1 Scope 
 
Information enterprise systems should be secured against potential risks and vulnerable 
attacks. Event-driven Process Chain (EPC) is a modeling language used to define business 
processes. Although serving its primary purpose at the high-degree, EPC is not helpful to 
elicit security concerns when developing information enterprise systems. 
 
Security analysis should start from the early stages, for example from the business process 
modeling [6] [8] [9] [24] [25]. Business analysts need to invest in security analysis 
additionally using other approaches and understanding how these approaches could be 
aligned to the existing business models. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
Business processes development includes multiple perspectives and viewpoints [6] [8] [9] 
[24] [25], thus combined application of these techniques could much improve the 
understanding of different stakeholders needs with respect to the security risks. It would 
also contribute to the quality of system security developed through different development 
stages.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop set of rules and guidelines in order to measure the 
suitability of Event-driven Process Chain for capturing security concerns. The metric unit 
during this measurement is the Security Risk Management. The outcome of the analysis of 
EPC and SRM will also be the answer of the question “Why security risk management is 
important?”. The motivative answer is that the use of security risk management helps 
security professionals align with business objectives rather than focusing entirely on 
destroying the vulnerability as soon as it raises its head. 
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1.3 Problem / Research Question 
 
Information system security risk management (ISSRM [11]) is the method used as the path 
for management of security controls. In this thesis the main expected outcome of the 
alignment process is the coverage of the ISSRM domain by EPC, since EPC is not helpful 
to elicit security concerns when developing information enterprise systems.  
 
The result of the alignment will help us to answer our research question “How EPC could 
be extended to support security risk management?” by identifying which constructs or 
characteristics of EPC are more likely to support ISSRM activities, and how they should be 
improved for this. The following research question is “What is the benefit of such 
extension?”, where the validation of the extended EPC will be answer of this question. 
   
In addition, we define set of guidelines how to transform extended EPC model to the later 
stage of system development, i.e. Transformation from extended EPC to the models of 
Mal-Activity Diagrams (MAD [5]). In such a way we continue secure system definition 
not only at the business process stage, but also at the requirement analysis and design 
stages. 
 
1.4 Introduction of Solution  
 
The characteristic of the alignment process is the Security Risk Analysis contribution of 
ISSRM. By security risk analysis, EPC is analysed with different styles at early stage 
requirements design. EPC is analysed and grouped into three different concepts which are 
asset, risk and risk treatment. This grouping clarifies the model and makes the Security 
Risk Analysis easier to analyse step by step.   
 
To align EPC with the ISSRM domain model, the method shown in Figure 1.1 is applied. 
As it is shown in Figure 1.1, Meta-Model and glossary of ISSRM domain model are 
synthesized with the Meta-Model and Documentation of EPC. This synthesis is called as 
Concept Alignment. Consequently, an “ISSRM-oriented” Meta-Model of EPC will be 
produced after the alignment process. By “ISSRM-oriented”, we mean a Meta-Model 
aligned on the ISSRM domain model and thus showing only concepts and relationships 
semantically equivalent to those of the ISSRM domain model. This gives a clear view of 
the coverage domain of the security-oriented language with regards to ISSRM [13]. In the 
end we obtain construct extensions and we call the new extended language as Security-
Oriented EPC. Later, we define transformation rules from Security-Oriented EPC to MAD 
and validate these transformations with a case study.  
  
We validate our proposal in a case study where the quality of resulting models would be 
evaluated and compared. We believe that our proposal will suggest practitioners the means 
to understand security threats as soon as possible and to address how systematically 
through the whole system development cycle. 
13 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Concept alignment between ISSRM domain model and EPC [13]. 
 
1.5 Structure 
 
In this thesis, first of all the existing state of the art is reviewed. BPMLs (Activity 
Diagrams, Petri Nets, YAWL, BPMN and EPC) and SMLs (KAOS Extention to Security, 
Misuse Cases and Mal-Activity Diagrams) are analysed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
including illustration of models with a running example. In Chapter 4, definition of the 
domain model of ISSRM, Risk Management Process, and analysis of some security 
modeling languages with ISSRM is given. 
 
After providing the background information, alignment between EPC and ISSRM is 
performed in Chapter 5. The alignment process is performed by following six steps of 
Security Risk Modeling defined in [11]. Alignment process is followed by construct 
extension of the EPC language. Concrete and abstrax syntax EPC extensions are done in 
Chapter 6 in higher and lower level. The high level extensions contain “process path” 
construct of EPC whereas low level extensions contain all the constructs of EPC. The 
extended language is called Security-Oriented EPC. 
 
Chapter 7 illustrates how to capture and measure security risks using Security-Oriented 
EPC by defining metrics and Return on Security Investment (ROSI [27]).  
 
Chapter 8 consists of transformation rules from Security-Oriented EPC to Mal-Activity 
Diagrams [5]. Transformation is done into three levels of ISSRM concepts; asset, risk, risk 
treatment. 
 
Next, validation is done in Chapter 9 with a descriptive case study method [29]. Validation 
is followed by the conclusion in Chapter 10.     
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Chapter 2. BUSINESS PROCESS MODELING LANGUAGES 
 
Business Process Modeling Language (BPML) is a language for business process 
modeling. As the structure of definition process, descriptions including basic graphical 
elements are given and later with a specific example all these languages are being 
illustrated. This modeling example is Online Banking and its solutions have features and 
capabilities in common. The common features will help us to compare the business 
modeling languages in conclusion and understand why EPC is the language we choose for 
the alignment and extension process. 
 
2.1 Activity Diagrams 
 
Activity Diagrams [6] define the workflow behavior of a system. The diagrams describe 
the state of activities by showing the sequence of activities performed.  Activity diagrams 
show activities which are conditional or paralel [6]. Thus, the reason to use activity 
diagrams is to model the workflow behind the system being designed. Activity Diagrams 
are helpful for analyzing a use case by describing what actions need to take place and when 
they should occur describing a complex sequential algorithm and modeling applications 
with parallel processes [6]. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Activity Diagram of withdraw money from ATM. 
 
Activity Diagram displays a special state diagram where most of the states are action states 
and most of the transitions are triggered by completion of the actions in the source states. If 
16 
 
we illustrate a simple example called “Withdraw Money” based on the Online Banking 
problem, activity diagram of the model should look like in Figure 2.1. In a single activity 
diagram, activities belong to one actor. In the example in Figure 2.1, bank user uses ATM 
to withdraw money and steps of this process shown in order. First, the user inserts his card, 
if the card is valid user continues his transaction. Later PIN code is controlled, if entered 
PIN code is valid then user selects the service and withdraws money. Last activity is 
ejecting card and finishing the transaction.  
 
Besides, activity diagrams fit with security engineering requirements [17]. Activity 
Diagrams are widely used in security engineering since activities are easy to be controlled 
and their structure is simple so that in security level they are useful to define security 
requirements of the corresponding model [17].  
 
Table 2.1 – Legend for Activity Diagrams. 
Form Name Description 
 
Activity 
The rounded rectangles represent activities that occur. 
An activity may be physical. 
 Initial Node 
The filled in circle is the starting point of the 
diagram.  An initial node isn’t required although it 
does make it significantly easier to read the diagram. 
 Final Node 
The filled circle with a border is the ending point.  An 
activity diagram can have zero or more activity final 
nodes. 
 
Join 
A black bar with several flows entering it and one 
leaving it.  All flows going into the join must reach it 
before processing may continue.  This denotes the end 
of parallel processing. 
 
Fork 
A black bar with one flow going into it and several 
leaving it.  This denotes the beginning of parallel 
activity. 
 Flow Defines the execution order of activities. 
  
2.2 Petri Nets 
 
Petri Nets is a basic model of parallel and distributed systems which is designed by Carl 
Adam Petri in 1962 [7] based on his PhD Thesis titled Kommunikation mit Automaten. The 
idea is to describe state changes in a system with transitions. Petri nets contain places and 
transitions that may be connected by directed arcs. In general, transitions might fire if there 
are tokens on corresponding places. Firing transitions will remove tokens and place new 
tokens on new places.  
 
According to the concept Place/Transition Nets, we can describe Petri nets and their firing 
rules as follows; a place might have several tokens which may be interpreted as resources 
and there might be several input and output arcs between a place and a transition. Besides, 
the number of these arcs is shown as the weight of a single arc. A transition is enabled if 
each input place of it contains at least as many tokens as the corresponding input arc 
17 
 
weight indicates. When an enabled transition is fired its input arc weights are subtracted 
from the input place markings and its output arc weights are added to the output place 
markings. Furthermore, we illustrate “Withdraw Money” process of Online Banking 
problem in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Plain Petri Net Model of withdraw money from ATM. 
 
Table 2.2 – Legend for Petri Nets. 
Form Name Description 
 Transition 
Symbolises actions and a place symbolises states or conditions 
which need to be met before an action can be achieved. 
 Place 
Contains tokens that may move to other places by executing 
firing actions. 
 Token Represents the object. 
 Flow Defines the execution order of transitions and places. 
 
Petri Nets does not have any documentation researches related to security engineering on 
web, consequently, it makes sense to consider Petri nets as an impractical business process 
modeling language in security engineering. Although Petri Nets have existed for many 
decades, they have been recently used to verify cryptographic and security protocols and 
still needs to be improved [7]. Thus, Petri Nets might be used in the analysis of security 
protocols and it is recommended to combine different cryptographic algorithms together in 
the analysis [7]. 
 
2.3 Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL) 
 
Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL) is a fully open-source workflow system or 
business process management system which is based on a workflow definition language. It 
is capable of capturing all sorts of flow dependencies between tasks.  
 
YAWL has open interfaces based on Web standards which enable developers to plug-in 
existing applications and to extend and to customise the system in many different ways [8]. 
It provides a graphical editor with built-in verification functionality which significantly 
helps developers to takeover workflow models and to detect subtle. Besides, YAWL is, 
without doubt, the most mature open-source workflow management systems around [8]. 
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Starting from its beginnings as a prototype, YAWL has developed an enterprise-grade 
workflow engine regards to contributions from organisations and individuals who have 
used it. As a result, this issue demonstrated commitment from its users and community of 
developers also ensures the continuity of the system. 
 
Table 2.3 – Legend for YAWL Modeling. 
Form Name Description 
 
Starting 
Point 
An input condition which acts as the starting point. 
 End Point An output condition which signals the end. 
 XOR-Split 
Used to trigger only one outgoing flow. It is best used for 
automatically choosing between a number of possible 
exclusive alternatives once a task completes. 
 AND-Split 
Used to start a number of new pieces of work simultaneously. 
It can be viewed as a specialisation of the OR-Split where 
work will be triggered to start on all outgoing flows. 
 OR-Split 
Used to trigger some, but not necessarily all outgoing flows to 
other tasks. It is best used when we won’t know until run-time 
exactly what concurrent resultant work can lead from the 
completion of a task. 
 AND-Join 
Wait to receive completed work form all of its incoming flows 
before beginning. It is typically used to synchronise pre-
requisite activities that must be completed before some new 
piece of work may begin. 
 
 
XOR-Join 
Once any work has completed on an incoming flow, a task 
with an XOR-Join will be capable of beginning work. It is 
typically used to allow new work to start so long as one of 
several different pieces of earlier work have been completed. 
 OR-Join 
Ensures that a task waits until all incoming flows have either 
finished, or will never finish. OR-Joins are “smart” [8]; they 
will only wait for something if it is necessary to wait. 
However, understanding models with OR-joins can be tricky 
and therefore OR-joins should be used sparingly. 
 Flow Defines the execution order of tasks, conditions and gates. 
 
Condition 
Decides the flow of the process to the next task according to 
conditions. 
 
Task 
Main elements of the modeling language, indicates the tasks of 
users. 
 
Basic terms in YAWL are Business Processes, Workflow Application, Workflow 
Specification, Workflow System, Workflow Engine, Case (Also known as Workflow 
Instance), Task (Also known as Activity), Work item (Also known as Task Instance), 
Worklist and Worklist Handler (Also known as Task Management Service). Figure 2.3 
illustrates the example workflow of “Withdraw Money” process in Online Banking 
problem.  
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Figure 2.3 – YAWL Model of withdraw money from ATM. 
 
In particular, YAWL is considered as a business process language to be used in security 
engineering since it is a very prosperous workflow definition language and capable of 
capturing all sorts of flow dependencies between tasks [18]. Besides, YAWL has 
developed a confident workflow engine regarding to additions from organisations and 
individuals who have used it and this workflow engine is also considered as secure [18]. 
 
2.4 Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) 
 
The Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) is a graphical notation which defines 
the steps in a business process and it is a standard set of diagramming conventions for 
describing business processes. BPMN is planned in order to visualize a powerful set of 
process flow semantics within a business process [9].  
 
BPMN is an enabler of Business Process Management (BPM) which is related with the 
management of business process improvements. The goal of BPMN is to yield a business 
process modeling notation which is clear by all business users, from business analysts who 
generate the design of the processes to the technical developers who have the responsibility 
for implementing the technology that proposed to perform those processes, and lastly to the 
managers who will manage and monitor those business processes [10].  
 
Figure 2.4 – BPMN Model of withdraw money from ATM. 
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According to the characteristics of BPMN, business process diagrams should be easily read 
and understood by the business users as well as the process developers should be able to 
easily read and implement a business process diagram without additional details. BPMN is 
different from object-oriented modeling techniques since it takes a process-oriented 
solution to process modeling which is more deputy to the way business analysts model. 
Therefore, BPMN is determined to provide competence information to let it be the source 
of an operable process [9]. 
 
Table 2.4 – Legend for BPMN. 
Form Name Description 
 
Task A Task is a unit of work, the job to be performed. 
 
Transaction 
A Transaction is a set of activities that logically 
belong together; it might follow a specified 
transaction protocol. 
 
Exclusive 
Gateway 
When splitting, it routes the sequence flow to 
exactly one of the outgoing branches. When 
merging, it awaits one incoming branch to complete 
before triggering the outgoing flow. 
 
Inclusive 
Gateway 
When splitting, one or more branches are activated. 
All active incoming branches must complete before 
merging. 
 
Parallel Gateway 
When used to split the sequence flow, all outgoing 
branches are activated simultaneously. When 
merging parallel branches it waits for all incoming 
branches to complete before triggering the outgoing 
flow. 
 
Start Event An input condition which acts as the starting point. 
 
End Event An output condition which signals the end. 
 Sequence Flow Defines the execution order of activities. 
 
Event-based 
Gateway 
Is always followed by catching events or receive 
tasks. Sequence flow is routed to the subsequent 
event/task which happens first. 
 
Complex 
Gateway 
Complex merging and branching behavior that is not 
captured by other gateways. 
 Default Flow 
The default branch to be chosen if all other 
conditions evaluate to false. 
 
 
Structure of BPMN consists of a diagram which is called the Business Process Diagram 
(BPD). The BPMN Business Process Diagram supplies the ability to model complex 
business processes but it has been planned in order to be easy to use and to understand. A 
basic model of a business process workflow consists of the business process starting event, 
business decisions, workflow branching (gateways) and workflow outputs & results. In 
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Figure 2.4, the business process workflow indicates a simple “Withdraw Money” process 
based on Online Banking problem. 
 
BPMN does not explicitly consider mechanisms to represent security requirements [15]. 
However, among the set of symbols used fort he construction of the business process 
diagram, artifacts can be used to express such requirements. Basically, BPMN opens an 
opportunity to incorporate security requirements which allows us to improve this aspect of 
the systems from early stages into software development [15]. 
 
2.5 Event-Driven Process Chain (EPC) 
 
Event-Driven Process Chain (EPC) is a method to visualize events and functions by which 
the logical timing of a business process is shown. As a result, event driven process chain is 
the description method for business processes. Event driven is equivalent to describing the 
dynamic part of a business process which means that it is stated in which way and at what 
time a reaction that causes a change should occur. There are events and functions and the 
ability to distinguish them is a great importance. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – EPC diagram of withdraw money from ATM. 
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Table 2.5 – Legend for EPC. 
Form Name Description 
 
Event 
Event is an appearance of an object or change of the 
expression of an attribute. 
 
Function 
 
Function is an activity concerning an object to support 
one or more enterprise objects. Functions        refer to an 
action that uses time and they are registered at the 
function view. 
 
AND Two events / functions must occur. 
 
OR One event / function AND / OR another event / function 
must occur. 
 
XOR (= exclusive OR) Either an event / a function OR 
another event / function must occur. 
 Control Flow Control flow connects the Events, Functions and 
Decision Gates. 
 
Organisation 
Unit 
An organisation unit determines which person or 
organisation within the structure of an enterprise is 
responsible for a specific function. 
 
Information 
Flow 
Information flow show the connection between 
functions and input or output data. 
 Assignment 
Assignments show the connection between an 
organisation unit and the function. 
 
Resource Unit 
Resource unit can be input data serving as the basis for a 
function, or output data produced by a function. 
 
Process Path 
A process path shows the connection from or to other 
processes. 
 
2.5.1 Introduction to Event-Driven Process Chain 
 
The integration of the data view into event-driven process chain can be defined as 
functions work on data as input data change to output data and they produce events (data-
state changes). According to the Online Banking problem, “Withdraw Money” example is 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. In EPC form there are events which are shown before/after 
functions, and related to the functions assigned organisational units are shown as well. 
Another difference can be seen that some decision gates such as AND, OR and XOR are 
used here. 
 
Furthermore, based on security engineering, event-driven process chain is not efficient 
compared to other business process modeling languages since there are not any researches 
or investigation done about this topic. As a result, EPC notation is mostly used for business 
modeling purpose without considering the security engineering requirements. 
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2.5.2 Meta-Model of EPC and Construct Definitions 
 
In previous section, EPC is defined with an illustrated online banking example. In this 
section, EPC and its Meta-Model will be defined. Moreover, construct definitions will be 
given.  
 
Metamodeling is the construction of a collection of concepts within a certain domain. A 
model is an abstraction of phenomena in the real world and a metamodel is yet another 
abstraction, highlighting properties of the model itself. A model conforms to its metamodel 
in the way that a computer program conforms to the grammar of the programming 
language in which it is written. 
 
The Event-Driven Process Chain (EPC) was developed in 1992 at the Institute for 
Information Systems in Saarbruecken in cooperation with SAP AG. EPC-models are 
central elements of BPM last but not least due to its use in the SAP R/3 reference model of 
SAP AG and the ARIS Toolset of IDS Scheer AG. Enterprises model their process data as 
EPC-models in order to plan, design, simulate and control private enterprise processes. The 
EPC is a core part of the ARIS-framework and has a big role in combining the different 
views towards the description of enterprises and information systems in the control view 
on the conceptual level [24] [25].   
 
One of the main steps of the alignment process of EPC and ISSRM will be the notation of 
the Meta-Model of EPC in UML Class Diagram model since the domain model of ISSRM 
is defined as a UML Class Diagram model. ISSRM domain model will be shown and 
explained in Chapter 4. Figure 2.6 shows the Meta-Model of EPC. This UML Class 
Diagram based Meta-Model is exactly structured by the constructs of EPC. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 – EPC Meta-Model. 
 
In Figure 2.6, if we consider the “Process Element” class, every process element is part of 
exactly one process and each process consists of one or more process elements. The class 
process element can be used to create hierarchies of process models. Therefore a function 
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is detailed by a sub-process. This refining of functions with sub-processes can be done 
over an inlimited number of levels. One process element can refine no or many functions 
where a function can either be not refined or be refined by exactly one process element.  
 
“Organisation Unit” class can be assigned to functions. An organisation unit such as 
applications systems or documents has its resource specific type relation to a function. For 
example, an organisational unit may have the type of relation “is responsible for”, which is 
not allowed for a document.  
 
There are nine main contructs exist in EPC and these constructs are shown in previous 
section in Table 2.5. Below these constructs are defined: 
 
Events are passive elements in EPC. They describe under what conditions a function or a 
process works or which state a function or a process results in. In particular, an EPC 
diagram must start with an event and end with an event. 
 
Functions describe transformations from an initial state to a resulting state. In case 
different resulting states can occur, the selection of the respective resulting state can be 
modeled explicitly as a decision function using logical connectors. Functions can be 
refined into another EPC. In this case it is called hierarchical function.  
 
Organisation units decide which person or organisation within the structure of an 
enterprise is responsible for a specific function.  
 
Resource units can be the information, material, or resource objects portray objects in the 
real world, for example business objects, entities, etc., which can be input data serving as 
the basis for a function, or output data produced by a function.  
 
In the EPC the logical relationships between elements in the control flow, that is, events 
and functions are described by logical connectors. With the help of logical connectors it is 
possible to split the control flow from one flow to two or more flows and to synchronize 
the control flow from two or more flows to one flow. There are three kinds of logical 
relationships defined in EPC:  
 
 Branch/Merge : Branch and merge correspond to making decision of which path to 
choose among several control flows. A branch may have one incoming control flow 
and two or more outgoing control flows. When the condition is fulfilled, a branch 
activates exactly only one of the outgoing control flows and deactivates the others. 
The counterpart of a branch is a merge. A merge may have two or more incoming 
flows and one outgoing control flow. A merge synchronizes an activated and the 
deactivated alternatives. The control will then be passed to the next element after 
the merge. A branch in the EPC is represented by an opening XOR, whereas a 
merge is represented as a closing XOR connectors. 
 
 Fork/Join : Fork and join correspond to activating all paths in the control flow 
concurrently. A fork may have one incoming control flow and two or more 
outgoing control flows. When the condition is fulfilled, a fork activates all of the 
outgoing control flows in parallel. A join may have two or more incoming control 
flows and one outgoing control flow. A join synchronizes all activated incoming 
control flows.  
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 OR : An 'OR' relationship corresponds to activating one or more paths among 
control flows. An opening 'OR' connector may have one incoming control flow and 
two or more outgoing control flows.  
 
A control flow connects events with functions, process paths, or logical connectors creating 
chronological sequence and logical interdependencies between them.  
 
Information flows show the connection between functions and input or output data, upon 
which the function reads changes or writes. 
 
Organisation unit assignments show the connection between an organisation unit and the 
function it is responsible for. 
 
Process paths serve as navigation aid in the EPC. They show the connection from or to 
other processes. To employ the process path symbol in an EPC diagram, a symbol is 
connected to the process path symbol, indicating that the process diagramed incorporates 
the entirety of a second process which, for diagramatic simplicity, is represented by a 
single symbol. 
 
2.5.3 Integrity Constraints in Meta-Model of EPC 
 
Integrity constraints are used to ensure accuracy and consistency of data in a relational 
database. Data integrity is handled in a relational database through the concept 
ofreferential integrity. In EPC Meta-Model, we also identify the integrity constraints due to 
prevent conflictions about the relationship between the Connected Elements abstract class 
and the Control Flow class. As it is seen from the model, control flow is the actor of 
connecting each connected elements to each other. However, there are some connected 
elements which can not follow or connected to each other during the actual process, in this 
manner we identify specific elements and their restrictions. In particular, as well as two 
different events can not be connected to each other, two different functions can not. Events 
are followed by functions and functions are followed by events. 
 
2.6 Comparison and Summary 
 
In this chapter, five different business process modeling languages (Activity Diagrams [6], 
EPC [24] [25], Petri Nets [7], YAWL [8] and BPMN [9]) are analysed based on a structure 
containing the general description of the language, introduction of the principles of the 
language, application process of the language and the significance of the language 
according to the security engineering. Table 2.6 indicates the major differences of these 
five business process modeling languages based on two different criterias; Complexity and 
Security Coverage. Complexity refers to number of constructs which are described in 
legend tables of languages and Security Coverage refers to the percentage of usage of these 
constructs in security criterion. This percentage is calculated through the ratio between the 
total construct number shown in a legend table of a language and the total construct 
number which are considered to be related with security criterion. In general, the ratios are, 
order based on the Table 2.6, (Initial Node, Final Node, Join, Fork, Flow) 5/6, 0/6, 0/4, 
(Starting Point, End Point, XOR-Split, AND-Split, OR-Split, AND-Join, XOR-Join, OR-
Join, Flow, Condition) 10/11, 0/11. 
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Table 2.6 – Comparison of Business Process Modeling Languages. 
Criteria\Language Activity 
Diagrams 
EPC Petri Nets YAWL BPMN 
Complexity 6 6 4 11 11 
Security 
Coverage 
83% 0% 0% 91% 0% 
 
In particular, during the answering the question “How does the overview above contribute 
to the research question?”, security coverage is the key point. According to the security 
coverage percentage of each language, we assume that the alignment of the language 
which has low percentage will be more complex than the one which has high percentage. 
Because during the concept alignment, security risk analysis will be performed on 
language constructs based and as long as these constructs are covered by security criteria 
the process will be clear. Consequently, according to the research question, alignment of 
EPC, Petri Nets and BPMN with ISSRM domain model will be more challenging than the 
alignment of Activity Diagrams and YAWL. Besides, this comparison also showed us that 
EPC is not helpful to elicit security concerns. 
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Chapter 3. SECURITY MODELING LANGUAGES 
 
Security modeling languages are the modeling languages which support security 
requirements. In this chapter, KAOS extention to Security [2], Misuse Cases [3] and Mal-
Activity Diagrams [5] are defined. Descriptions include basic graphical elements and later 
with an example all these languages are being illustrated. This modeling example is Online 
Banking and its solutions have features and capabilities in common. In the end, based on 
common and unique capabilities of the languages, a comparison is made in order to choose 
one of the languages to use during the Security-Oriented EPC transformation. 
 
3.1 KAOS Extention to Security 
 
To define KAOS Extention to security, we present a requirements engineering method for 
elaborating security requirements based on the incremental building and specification of 
two concurrent models: [2] an intentional model of the system-to-be and an intentional 
anti-model yielding vulnerabilities and capabilities required for achieving the anti-goals of 
threatening security goals from the original model. After the procedure, the original model 
is enriched with new security requirements derived as countermeasures to the anti-model. 
This approach extends the KAOS framework for goal-oriented requirements engineering in 
several ways which are mentioned below [2]: 
 
 it extends the specification language, 
 it provides additional specification patterns for formal elicitation of candidate 
security requirements to start the analysis, 
 it introduces a duality principle for richer modeling of threats; system goals, 
requirements, expectations software services, implementable anti-requirements and 
software vulnerabilities. 
 
The elements of KAOS modeling are; Goal, Requirement, Operation, Agent, Object, 
Domain, Input, Output, Performance, G-Refinement, Alternative G-Refinement, 
Responsibility and Operationalisation. In particular, illustration of KAOS Extention to 
Security based on Online Banking problem shown in Figure 3.1 (customer side) and Figure 
3.2 (attacker side). To analyse the problem, the risk management process is applied. Later, 
security objectives are determined. It results in introduction and elaboration of new goals. 
For example, goal Avoid[Account# and PinKnownByThief] addresses the confidentiality 
of the business assets like Pin and Account number. Next, risk analysis and assessment is 
considered by negating the goal. 
 
In security engineering, the application layer has received much less attention to date 
compared with the crypto, protocol and system/language layers [2]. For security assurance 
at this layer as a precondition, analysts have to ensure that application-specific security 
requirements are made clear, accurate, competence and non-conflicting with other 
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requirements and complete. We presented the requirements engineering method for this 
security assurance at the very beginning of our definition.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Online Banking Problem - Extended Operational Model (Customer Side). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Online Banking Problem - Risk Analysis and Assessment Model (Attacker 
Side). 
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Table 3.1 – Legend for Kaos Extention to Security. 
Form Name Description 
 
Goal 
A prescriptive statement of intent about some 
system whose satisfaction in general requires 
the cooperation of some of the agents 
forming that system. 
 
Requirement 
A terminal goal under responsibility of an 
agent in the software-to-be. 
 
Agent 
Active components such as humans, devices, 
legacy software or software-to-be 
components that play some role towards goal 
satisfaction. 
 
Domain Prop. 
Descriptive statements about the environment 
such as physical laws, organisational norms 
or policies, etc. 
 
Responsibility 
Relationship between agent and goal which 
refers to responsibility of agent 
 
G-Refinement 
Relate a goal to a set of subgoals (called 
refinement) possibly conjoined with domain 
properties. 
 
Alternative G- 
Refinement 
Relate a goal to a set of alternative 
refinements. 
 Performance Shows the operations performed by an agent. 
 Operation Actions performed by an agent. 
 
3.2 Misuse Cases 
 
A Misuse Case is Use Case from the point of view of an actor hostile to the system under 
design which turns out to have many possible applications, [3] and to interact with Use 
Cases in useful ways. Some misuse cases exist in highly specific situations and some 
others continually threaten systems. It is possible to develop misuse and use cases 
recursively, going from system to subsystem levels. Lower-level cases can highlight 
outlooks not considered at higher levels, which may cause another analysis. The approach 
offers rich possibilities for exploring, [4] understanding and validating the requirements in 
any direction.  
 
Drawing the agents and misuse cases explicitly clarifies focus attention on the elements of 
the scenario. Besides, functional (depends on the design) and non-functional (Reliability, 
Maintainability, Portability, Testability and so on) requirements exist in Misuse Cases. 
Basic elements of the model are; (Mis)Users and (Mis)Use Cases and their relationships 
such as treatment and mitigation.  
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Figure 3.3 – Online Banking, Use Cases (on the left) and Misuse Cases (on the right) based 
on Security Requirements. 
 
Table 3.2 – Legend for Misuse Cases. 
Form Name Description 
 
Use Case 
A description of a potential series of 
interactions between a software module and 
an external agent, which lead the agent 
towards something useful. 
 
Misuse Case 
A sequence of actions, including variants, that 
a system or other entity can perform, 
interacting with misusers of the entity and 
causing harm to some stakeholder if the 
sequence is allowed to complete. 
 
Actor (User) An actor that initiates use cases. 
   
Actor (Misuser) 
An actor that initiates misuse cases, either 
intentionally or inadvertently. 
Mitigate Use case mitigate 
misuse case 
The use case is a countermeasure against a 
misuse case, i.e., the use case reduces the 
misuse case’s chance of succeeding. 
Threaten Misuse case 
threaten use case 
The use case is exploited or hindered by a 
misuse case. 
 Include Shows the subcases of a case in detailed. 
 
In Figure 3.3, the Use Case (client side) and the Misuse Case (attacker side) diagrams are 
shown according to Online Banking problem. As it is seen in the figure, the client can 
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achieve the money transaction including necessary processes to succeed. Accordingly, the 
client has to avoid attacker steal his money by the mitigation process. Since the attacker is 
misuser, his acts are shown as misuse cases in black circles which threaten the acts of the 
client. 
 
To elicit security requirements with misuse case, following five processes are proposed; 
identifying critical assets in the system, defining security goals for each asset, identifying 
threats, identifying and analyzing risks and  defining security requirements. As long as 
these five significant processes are successfully run, Misuse Cases might be very effective 
in security engineering in many different projects such as [3] Knowledge Map Application 
in an EU-funded Research Project, Open Web Application Security Project, E-shop and 
Telemedicine Projects and so on. 
 
3.3 Mal-Activity Diagrams 
 
Mal(icious)-Activity Diagrams are same with ordinary UML Activity diagrams with their 
syntax and semantics, additionally activities in Mal-Activity Diagrams are shown with 
icons which are the inverse of normal activity icons. Besides, actors are indicated with 
swim-lanes where the actor name is shown inverse [5]. Also in Mal-Activity Diagrams 
decision boxes are shown as the inverse of normal decision boxes.  
 
The Mal(icious)-Activity Diagram is not the only notation utilizing inverted icons to 
indicate security threats [5]. For instance, considering the difference between mal-activity 
diagrams and misuse case diagrams, the main difference is the same as the difference 
between normal activity diagrams and use case diagrams, which means that they are both 
useful for seperate purposes. Besides, Mal-Activity diagrams would not indicate sequences 
of activities like an activity diagram, and also not exactly where a certain malicious 
activity might fit into a business process or how the process could be changed to deal with 
it.  
 
If we illustrate the Mal-Activity model of Online Banking problem we obtain a diagram 
shown in Figure 3.4. There are three actors with their swimlanes. Client performs activities 
in order to transact by using ATM banking system while attacker performs activities 
indicating the threat and cases of security failure during the transaction process. Besides, 
attacker performs activities where he can steal the bank card and PIN information in order 
to use maliciuos online transactions. 
 
Based on security engineering, Mal-Activity diagrams are convenient to clarify situations 
and make assumption by relating it with security requirements [16]. Besides, Mal-Activity 
diagrams are also used in social engineering since they are considered as one of the best 
appropriate way to describe social engineering attacks [16]. 
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Figure 3.4 – Online Banking, Mal-Activity diagrams of client and attacker in banking 
system. 
 
Table 3.3 – Legend for Mal-Activity Diagrams. 
Form Name Description 
 
(Mal) Swimlane An actor initiates activities. 
 
Activity 
The rounded rectangles represent activities 
that occur. An activity may be physical. 
 
Mal-Activity 
The rounded rectangles represent malicious 
activities that occur. A malicious activity may 
be physical. 
 Initial Node 
The filled in circle is the starting point of the 
diagram.  An initial node isn’t required 
although it does make it significantly easier to 
read the diagram. 
 Final Node 
The filled circle with a border is the ending 
point.  An activity diagram can have zero or 
more activity final nodes. 
 Decision 
Decision gates which are used where different 
decisions can occur. 
 ControlFlow Defines the execution order of activities. 
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3.4 Comparison and Summary 
 
Table 3.4 indicates the major differences of three security modeling languages (KAOS 
Extention to Security [2], Misuse Cases [3] and Mal-Activity Diagrams [5]) based on two 
different criterias; Complexity and Security Coverage. Complexity refers to number of 
constructs which are described in legend tables of languages and Security Coverage refers 
to the percentage of usage of these constructs in security criterion. This percentage is 
calculated through the ratio between the total construct number shown in a legend table of 
languages and the total construct number which are considered to be related with security 
criterion. In general, the ratios are, order based on the Table 3.4, (Goal, Requirement, 
Agent, Domain Prop., Responsibility, G-Refinement, Alternative G- Refinement for KeS) 
7/9, (Misuse Case, Actor/Misuser, Use case mitigate Misuse Case, Misuse case threaten 
Use Case, Include for Misuse Cases) 5/7, (Mal-Swimlane, Mal-Activity, Initial Node, Final 
Node, Decision, ControlFlow for MAD) 6/7. 
 
Table 3.4 – Comparison of Security Modeling Languages. 
Criteria\Language KAOS Extention 
To Security 
Misuse Cases 
Mal-Activity 
Diagrams 
Complexity 9 7 7 
Security Coverage 78% 71% 85% 
 
According to the security coverage percentage of each language, we assume that the 
alignment of the language which has low percentage will be more complex than the one 
which has high percentage. Since during the concept alignment, security risk analysis will 
be performed on language constructs based and as long as these constructs are covered by 
security criteria the process will be less complex. Consequently, alignment of Mal-Activity 
Diagrams with ISSRM domain model will be less challenging than the alignment of 
Misuse Cases and KeS. However, it is necessary to mention that these security coverage 
percentages are based on the constructs of the language. It definitely does not mean that if 
a language has less percentage then it will have less efficiency of alignment, because there 
are other concepts and definitions which affect the alignment process. Also, since MAD 
has the highest constructual based security coverage, we choose it as a potential language 
during the transforming constructs from extended EPC (Security-Oriented EPC) to a 
security modeling language. 
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Chapter 4. SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Security Risk Management is the method used as the path to reach reasonable and 
appropriate spending and management of security controls. This chapter is divided into 
three parts; Model-Based Security Analysis in seven steps with CORAS method [19], 
Goal-Risk Framework [20] and Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM 
[11]). 
 
4.1 Model-Based Security Analysis with CORAS Method 
 
A security risk analysis provides answers to many questions. CORAS is a method for 
managing security risk analysis and it provides a customised language for threat and risk 
modeling, and comes with detailed guidelines explaining how the language should be used 
to capture and model relevant information during the various stages of the security analysis 
[19]. In addition, it is necessary to mention that CORAS is model-based and Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) can be used to model the target of the analysis. Seven steps of 
security analysis in CORAS are summarised below and the structure of each step includes 
tasks, participants of these tasks and the modeling guideline. 
 
Step 1 – Introductory Meeting 
Tasks: The security analysis method is introduced, then client presents goals and the target 
of the analysis, also the focus and scope of the analysis is set, lastly meetings and 
workshops are planned. 
Participants: Analysis Leader (required), Analysis Secretary (required), Representatives of 
the Client. 
Modeling guideline: System description. 
 
Step 2 – High-Level Analysis 
Tasks: The target as understood by the analysts is presented, the assets are identified and a 
high-level analysis is conducted. 
Participants: Security Analysis Leader (required), Security Analysis Secretary (required), 
Representatives of the Client. 
Modeling guideline: Asset diagrams, Target descriptions. 
 
Step 3 – Approval  
Tasks: The client approves target descriptions and asset descriptions, the assets should be 
ranked according to importance, consequence scales must be set for each asset within the 
scope of the analysis, a likelihood scale must be defined and the client must decide risk 
evaluation criteria for each asset within the scope of the analysis.  
Participants: Security Analysis Leader (required), Security Analysis Secretary (required), 
Representatives of the Client.  
Besides, no modeling guidelines are defined in this step. 
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Step 4 – Risk Identification 
Tasks: The initial threat diagrams should be completed with identified threats, 
vulnerabilities, threat scenarios and unwanted incidents. 
Participants: Security Analysis Leader (required), Security Analysis Secretary (required), 
Representatives of the Client. 
Modeling guideline: Threat diagrams. 
 
Step 5 – Risk Estimation 
Tasks: Every threat scenario must be given a likelihood estimate and unwanted incident 
likelihoods are based on these and every relation between an unwanted incident and an 
asset must be given a consequence estimate. 
Participants: Security Analysis Leader (required), Security Analysis Secretary (required), 
Representatives of the Client. 
Modeling guideline: Risk estimation on threat diagrams. 
 
Step 6 – Risk Evaluation 
Tasks: Likelihood and consequence estimates should be confirmed or adjusted, the final 
adjustments of the acceptable area in the risk matrices should be made and an overview of 
the risk may be given in a risk diagram. 
Participants: Security Analysis Leader (required), Security Analysis Secretary (required), 
Representatives of the Client. 
Modeling guideline: Risk diagrams. 
 
Step 7 – Risk Treatment 
Tasks: Adding treatments to threat diagrams, estimating the cost/benefit of each treatment 
and decide which ones to use and showing treatments in risk overview diagrams. 
Participants: Security Analysis Leader (required), Security Analysis Secretary (required), 
Representatives of the Client. 
Modeling guidelines: Treatment diagrams, Treatment overview diagrams. 
 
In conclusion, the focus on security risk of information systems, the heavy use of models 
to guide and structure the analysis and the specialised language for documenting, and 
communicating intermediate as well as the final results of the analysis characterise 
CORAS [19]. 
 
4.2 Goal-Risk Framework 
 
Research on Goal-Risk Framework is divided into three major areas [20]: Requirements 
Engineering, Secure and Dependable Engineering, and Risk Analysis.  
 
In Requirements Engineering, according to KAOS, a goal-oriented requirements 
engineering methodology aiming at modeling not only what and how aspect of 
requirements, but also why, who, and when [20]. Later, KAOS introduces also the concept 
of obstacle and anti-goal to analyze boundary conditions and failure situations for a design. 
Obstacles can be defined as situations which can lead to goal failure. Anti-goals can be 
defined as goals associated with malicious stakeholders, such as an attacker. Consequently, 
it is possible to say that obstacles are unintended risks and anti goals are threats or intended 
risks. These features make KAOS suitable for analyzing requirements for secure and/or 
dependable systems. I* modeling framework is extended to analyze risk and security issues 
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during requirement analysis [20]. The framework models business assets of an organisation 
and assets of its IT systems. Afterwards, countermeasures are selected to mitigate risks, 
thereby ensuring that risks will not affect any assets.  
 
In the area of Secure and Dependable Systems, the most popular analysis frameworks are 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
[20]. In security engineering, concepts such as attack trees and threat trees are similar to 
FTA, while other proposals such as UMLSec, SecureUML, Abuse Case, and Misuse Case 
constitute UML extensions intended to deal specifically with security concerns [20]. The 
most relevant work to clarify Goal-Risk Framework is the Defect Detection and Prevention 
(DDP). DDP consists of a three-layer model consisting, respectively of Objectives, Risks, 
and Mitigations. Each objective has a weight to represent its importance, each risk has a 
likelihood of occurrence, while every mitigation has a cost for its accomplishment. 
Severity of a risk can be represented by an impact relationship between an objective and a 
risk. Besides, a DDP model specifies how to compute the level of objective achievements 
and the cost of mitigations. This calculation lets one to evaluate the impact of a collection 
of countermeasures, thereby supporting risk analysis. Also the DDP model can be 
integrated with other quantitative frameworks (e.g., FMECA, FTA) in order to model and 
assess risks/failures [20]. 
 
In the area of Risk Analysis, uncertain events such as threats and failures are quantified 
with two attributes: likelihood and severity. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) is widely 
used for quantitative risk assessment, while approaches like FMECA quantify risk into 
qualitative values: frequent, reasonably probable, occasional, remote, and extremely 
unlikely [20]. Events are prioritized using the notion of ‘‘expectancy loss’’ resulted from 
them which is defined as the product of its likelihood and severity. Priority here reflects the 
criticality of an event. When resources are limited, an analyst may decide to adopt 
countermeasures for mitigating events on the basis of their priority. However, estimation of 
probabilities is generally imprecise, as they typically strongly depend on expert judgment. 
Approaches such as Multi-Attribute Risk Assessment can improve the risk assessment 
process by considering multi-attribute analysis [20]. In this process, many factors that can 
impact the quality of a system—such as reliability, availability, safety and 
confidentiality—are analyzed for potential risks [20]. For instance, an Air Traffic 
Management system is required to always be available and safe. Certain conditions such as 
radar noise can affect the normal behavior of the system and as a result impact on its 
safety. In many cases, the best way to deal with radar noise is to restart the system. This, 
however, impacts on its availability. This inter dependence of quality factors introduces the 
need for analysis that finds the right tradeoffs [20].  
 
4.3 Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) 
 
There are literally hundreds of ISSRM methods and standarts exist and generally consist of 
process guidelines which help identifying defenceless assests, determine security 
objectives, assess risks and define security requirements to treat the risks. By these 
methods and standarts it is possible to reduce the losses which might result from security 
problems.  
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4.3.1 The Domain Model of ISSRM  
 
The domain model of ISSRM, shown in Figure 4.1, consists of concepts related to each 
other. These domain model concepts are created during the alignment process of basic 
ISSRM concepts. All these concepts are linked to each other according to their 
relationships as well as grouped under three principal concepts [11]: asset-related concepts, 
risk-related concepts and risk treatment-related concepts. Definitions are introduced below. 
 
Asset can be anything which has value to the organisation and is important for achieving 
its objectives. There are different kinds of assets exist. Business asset is the information, 
process, skill inherent to the business of the organisation which has value to the 
organisation in terms of its business model. IS asset is a component of the IS which has 
value to the organisation and it is significant for achieving its objectives and supporting 
business assets. An IS asset can be a component of the IT system [11] such as hardware, 
software or network, but also people or facilities playing a role in the IS and therefore in its 
security. Security criterion (aka security property) is the property or constraint on business 
assets which characterises their security needs.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 – The domain model of ISSRM [11]. 
 
Risk is the synthesis of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities causing to a negative 
impact harming one or more of the assets. Threat and vulnerabilities are part of the risk 
event and impact is the result of the risk. As it is mentioned during the definition of Risk, 
Impact is the negative result of a risk which may damage assets of a system or an 
organisation, when a threat or an event is successful. It is possible to describe the impact at 
the level of IS assets or at the level of business assets where it negates security criteria 
[11]. We can define Event as the synthesis of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities. 
Besides, Vulnerability is the characteristic of an information system asset or group of 
information system assets that can form a weakness in terms of information system 
security. Threat is the potential attack which is achieved by an agent, that targets one or 
more information system assets and that may cause to harm to assets. Also a threat is 
formed of a threat agent and an attack method. Related to Threat, Threat agent is an agent 
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which can lead harm to assets of the information system. A threat agent triggers a threat 
and is also the source of a risk. Attack method is the standard means by which a threat 
agent carries out a threat.  
 
Risk treatment is defined as the decision of how to treat the specifically identified risks. 
The possible treatment should satisfy a security need which is expressed in generic and 
functional terms [11]. Categories of risk treatment decisions include; Avoiding the risk 
(risk avoidance decision), Reducing the risk (risk reduction decision), Transferring the risk 
(risk transfer decision), Retaining the risk (risk retention decision). There is a security 
requirement during the treatment process and it can be defined as a condition over the 
phenomena of the stage where it is purposed to make true by installing the information 
system in order to reduce risks. Lastly, Control (aka countermeasure or safeguard) is 
specified by a specific security requirement and it is designed to improve the security and 
implemented to fit with that requirement. Security controls can be processes, policies, 
devices, practices or other actions or components of the information system.  
 
4.3.2 Risk Management Process 
 
The application of the Risk Management Process is shown step by step in Figure 4.2. 
Below all these steps are described separately in order [11]:   
 
Context and asset identification can be defined as the description of organisation and its 
environment. Sensetive activities related to information security such as design of technical 
plans can be counted as an example of this step. 
 
Determination of security objectives is the process of determining the security objectives to 
be reached. During this work Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are significant 
concepts. If we illustrate an example in this step it is possible to mention that during the 
design, technical plans should be kept confidential. 
 
Risk analysis and assessment is the process of identifying risks and estimating them 
qualitatively or quantitatively. A rival of tries to use common operating system and 
network protocol weaknesses to penetrate on the personal computer of an employee can be 
an example of this step. 
 
Risk treatment process consists of risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer and risk 
retention. Reducing the preceding risk with some security controls implemented in the 
information system is an effective example at this step. 
 
Security requirements definition is basically the process of defining security solutions to 
mitigate the risks. If security requirements are unsatisfactory, it is essential to revise the 
risk treatment step and revise all of the preceding steps. 
 
Control selection and implementation is the process of implementing system 
countermeasures within organisation. The selection and the implementation of a firewall 
and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an illustrated example of this step. 
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Figure 4.2 – Security Risk Management Process [11]. 
 
4.3.3 Analysing Security Modeling Languages with ISSRM  
 
In this section we analyse KeS, Misuse Cases and MAD security modeling languages with 
ISSRM. During the state of art, in Chapter 3, we have given definitions about these three 
languages and in comparison and conclusion section we have compared their security 
coverage based on constructs in high level. Now we will review these languages and their 
alignment with ISSRM model in lower level. 
 
4.3.3.1 Alignment of KeS and ISSRM Model 
 
The alignment between KAOS Extention to Security (KeS) and ISSRM is analysed in 
three steps based on the three main concepts of ISSRM: 
 
Asset-related concepts – KeS is basically focused on the security of the system-to-be but it 
does not make a separation between the information system and business aspects. Besides, 
the alignment process includes all three ISSRM concepts concerning assets with the 
KAOS’ goal, requirement and expectation. The main idea of the security goals is to guard 
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system states against unauthorised access. Besides, in terms of KAOS this means that the 
security goals must describe confidentiality, privacy, integrity and availability goal and 
object properties which are concerned by potential risk events and threats [13]. Moreover, 
both goals and object attributes concerned by anti-goal with ISSRM security criteria are 
aligned. 
 
Risk-related concepts – At higher abstraction levels, an anti-goal might be defined as the 
event which is a combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities. At lower 
abstraction levels, an anti-goal might be defined as a threat which is a potential attack. In 
KAOS an anti-agent displays or controls objects and their behaviour. Besides, in KAOS an 
anti-agent performs operations which satisfy an anti-goal. These operations’ role is to 
change the state of the system-to-be using input/output relationships over the objects and 
their behaviour which means that by performing these operations the anti-agent breaks the 
security criteria. Thus, KAOS does not address two concepts from the ISSRM domain 
model which are; risk and impact. [13] This situation can be stated by the fact that KAOS 
was not specifically planned to evaluate the business context of an information system.  
 
Risk treatment-related concepts – ISSRM’s risk treatment resembles the countermeasures 
which are designed detailed after definition of the anti-goals [13]. Countermeasures can be 
defined as modeling expressions or “patterns” adopted by modelers. In KAOS, the 
countermeasures generally occur in new security goals which need to be set off in 
realizable security requirements. The set off operation and operationalisation of the new 
security goals lead to new system-to-be components recognizing the significant security 
means. Moreover, according to the ISSRM domain model, these new system-to-be 
components resemble controls. 
 
4.3.3.2 Alignment of Misuse Cases and ISSRM Model 
 
The alignment between Misuse Cases and ISSRM is analysed in three steps based on the 
three main concepts of ISSRM: 
 
Asset-related concepts – In misuse case, literature founded confusion seeking a 
correspondence for the notion of ISSRM security criteria [14]. The most significant assets 
in an organisation are defined as the knowledge and the skills of the workers but they are 
only defenceless remote through the misuse of other more concrete assets.  
 
Risk-related concepts – In this level, the risk is defined as the estimated likelihood of 
occurrence and cost of the damage if the threat occurs. This definition corresponds to 
definition of risk in ISSRM in terms of concerned concepts [14]. The notion of impact in 
misuse cases rises as the cost of the damage. Besides, according to the expression “The 
security threats identified can be described as misuse cases and misusers”, it is possible to 
mention that this expression corresponds to the ISSRM threat which is composed of a 
threat agent and an attack method. Moreover, specific correspondences between the 
misuser who is the actor that initiates misuse case and ISSRM threat agent are identified. 
Later align the misuse case which is a sequence of actions interacting with misuser and 
causing harm to stakeholder and the ISSRM attack method is aligned. At the end, threatens 
relationship which shows how a use case is exploited or hindered by a misuse case can be 
understood clearly as the target relationship between threat and information system asset. 
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Risk treatment-related concepts – It is recommended that for each defined threat and 
taking its risk into account, it is necessary to state requirements to reduce the threat. [14] 
This recommendation basically means that convenient security requirements should be 
stated and specified. Also, security requirements identified are specified as independent 
security use cases and the security use case should have a reduced relationship to a misuse 
case. It is possible to conclude that security use cases correspond to the ISSRM security 
requirements. Besides, the misuse case reduces link corresponds to the ISSRM reduces 
relationship [14]. The misuse cases do not specify anything which would correspond to the 
ISSRM notions of risk treatment or controls. 
 
4.3.3.3 Alignment of MAD and ISSRM Model 
 
The alignment between Mal-activity Diagrams (MAD) and ISSRM is analysed again in 
three steps based on the three main concepts of ISSRM: 
 
Asset-related Concepts – As we defined earlier, the ISSRM asset represents something of 
value for the organisation. The business asset is defined as the information, process or skill 
that is important to for the business. Activity diagrams are used to show the business 
workflow by combining constructs together, like: Activity, Decision and ControlFlow [28]. 
These constructs are mapped to the ISSRM business asset. The Swimlane construct holds 
the constructs (e.g. Activity and Decision) that are needed to support execution of business 
workflows. Thus, all these constructs are aligned to the IS assets. Consequently, Activity, 
Decision, WorkFlow and Swimlane are considered as IS asset. Lastly, if we consider the 
security criterion, it is possible to say that there is not such a construct in MAD to align 
security criterion. 
 
Risk-related Concepts – In MAD, Mal-Swimlane is used to define malicious actor that will 
harm the system by malicious activities, e.g. the Mal-activity constructs that are combined 
using Mal-decision and ControlFlow constructs [28]. Mal-swimlane is aligned to the 
ISSRM threat agent and process defined by combining Mal-activity constructs, to the 
ISSRM attack method. Mal-swimlane construct is later aligned to the ISSRM attack 
method since in MAD the malicious actor could use some means, which are defined as 
Mal-swimlane. Next, it is possible to say there is not any Mal-activity construct to align to 
the ISSRM vulnerabilities. In MAD the ISSRM impact can be expressed by using Mal-
activity constructs that belong to the Mal-Swimlane, characterized as the ISSRM attack 
method [28]. 
 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts – In MAD, the MitigationActivity construct is considered 
as a countermeasure [28]. The Swimlane holding the MitigationActivity constructs 
implements the countermeasures. Thus, such a Swimlane is aligned to the ISSRM controls.   
 
4.4 Summary 
 
Security Risk Management application is defined with different approaches in this chapter. 
Basically, with CORAS method [19] we focused on managing security risk analysis and 
providing a customised language for threat and risk modeling, this operation is done in 
seven steps. Based on Goal-Risk Framework [20], Security Risk Management is divided 
into three major areas: Requirements Engineering, Secure and Dependable Engineering, 
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and Risk Analysis. Afterwards, (ISSRM [11]) Information System Security Risk 
Management is defined with its domain model and three concepts; Asset, Risk and Risk 
Treatment, of that domain model. Lastly, Security Risk Management Process referenced by 
ISSRM is defined step by step. This process is similar with the CORAS approach since it 
is devided into steps and each step is followed by each other. In conclusion, we will 
continue with ISSRM approach during the alignment of EPC with security risk 
management since ISSRM is analysed in information system level and have construct 
based alignment with Mal-Activity Diagrams as well. The alignment results between MAD 
and ISSRM will also help us during the transforming the extended EPC to MAD. 
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Chapter 5. ALIGNMENT OF EPC AND ISSRM 
 
Modern information systems should be secured against potential risks and vulnerable 
attacks. Event-driven Process Chain (EPC [24] [25]) is a modeling language used to define 
business processes. Although serving its primary purpose at the high-degree, EPC is not 
helpful to elicit security concerns when developing information enterprise systems. 
 
Preferably security analysis should start from the early stages, for example from the 
business process modeling. Business analysts need to invest in security analysis 
additionally using other approaches and understanding how these approaches could be 
aligned to the existing business models. 
 
In this chapter we consider how the EPC approach could be applied according to ISSRM 
[11]. In particular, we will follow the six steps of the ISSRM process to investigate 
security risks in a running example (online registration process of the Internet Store) 
modeled using the EPC approach. Later, we will summarize our observation to the 
alignment of EPC to ISSRM. After all, we will obtain a new language called Security-
Oriented EPC. 
 
The main motivation of the alignment process is to cover the existing model with its 
security requirements. We will try to identify the elements that need to be secured using 
ISSRM and in the end we will define its security needs and security requirements.  
 
5.1 Security Risk Modeling with EPC 
 
The running example shown in Figure 5.1 is “Online registration process of the Internet 
Store”. The model will be analysed with defining asset related concepts, risk related 
concepts and risk treatment related concepts in next sections. When following the ISSRM 
process, first, we identify the content and valuable assets. Later security objectives are 
defined by considering the security needs of assets defined. Afterwards, risk analysis is 
done based on the defined security objectives. Lastly, risk treatment process is done with 
respect to security requirements definitions.  
 
5.1.1 Context and Asset Identification 
 
Let’s consider the following situation where the user wishes to start using the Internet 
Store System. In order to get details about the registration, the user sends an inquiry to the 
system administrator. The system accepts or denies the inquiry. In case of acceptance, 
administrator reads the inquiry and replies with guidelines (event positive demand for 
registration). This process is called message handling and shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 – EPC diagram of online registration and login processes of the Internet Store. 
 
After receiving the guidelines, the user registers to the internet store by submitting his data 
(resourse unit User Data which includes Username and Password as well). The system 
then accepts registration information and stores the data into Database of the system. After 
registering the valid username and password, now the user is able to login to Internet Store 
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System as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The system checks the validity of username and 
password and accordingly let user login or fail login process. 
 
With the presented running example, all assets are defined and classified in alignment table 
(Table 5.1) in section 5.2. 
 
Since the representation of the whole process consists of large amount of constructs, the 
construct of Process Path could be used to show whole model at the higher level of 
abstraction. Such a representation is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – EPC diagram of online registration and login processes of the Internet Store 
(with Process Paths). 
 
5.1.2 Determination of Security Objectives 
 
We identify several assets which need protection against security risks. Firstly, we need to 
ensure the Confidentiality of User Data (Username & Password). If confidentiality is 
revealed, the system violators could use the user’s personal data for the unintended 
purposes. In addition, Integrity of all the Business Processes (the ones in Figure 5.1) has to 
be ensured. If integrity is negated the system might be used not according to the intended 
purpose. 
 
5.1.3 Risk Analysis and Assessment 
 
In Figure 5.3, a part of the previous model visualizes a potential security risk. Let’s say 
that there exist a violator who would like to login to the system without registering his 
personal user account. 
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Figure 5.3 – Message Handling process including security risk attack. 
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In the model in Figure 5.3, violator sends an inquiry message to the system as it is done in 
Figure 5.1 by user. However, this time the inquiry message includes a spy program which 
is started after the admin accepts and reads the message. The spy program initializes a new 
event Execution of Spy program starts, and it is followed by the initialization of a new 
function called Spy program extracts data from DB which sends an inquiry to the database 
and extracts the usernames and passwords of existing users. This function is followed by 
another event which indicates the purpose of the attack, Data Extraction Succeeds. 
Simultaneously, positive demand for the registration state is approved. By the spy 
program, the stolen data then attached to the approval reply message of admin which is 
sent to the violator, this function is called Spy program attaches stolen data into approve 
message of admin and indicates the result of the attack. As a result, violator reaches his 
target and, therefore, in this model User Registration process path is not shown since 
violator is now able to continue his process by logging in. 
 
In this analysis we are able to identify the ISSRM threat agent (Violator) and the ISSRM 
attack method (Message including a spy program and extracting data from DB). 
Combination of these elements forms a security threat. The direct impact of this threat is 
the negation of the Confidentiality of User Data (Username & Password). In addition, this 
ISSRM impact provokes another impact (such as the Violator accesses the system with a 
stolen username and password and change the business processes according to his needs), 
which negates the Integrity of all the Business Processes. 
 
5.1.4 Risk Treatment 
 
Risk treatment is the part where it is decided how the identified security flows could be 
mitigated. In our running example, as all the threats are defined in previous sections we 
can take a risk reduction decision, which reduces the probability of the negative 
consequences, based on mentioned threats. In particular, we will modify our current online 
registration and login processes of the Internet Store. 
 
5.1.5 Security Requirements Definition 
 
To decrease the possibility of accepting the message which includes a spy program, first 
we introduce the message scanning in our existing model. Message scanning consists of 
Scanning system activated, Message is not safe and Registration failed events; Message is 
scanned and System blocks the user and deletes the message functions, shown in Figure 
5.4. If scanning of the message reports a problem, the message is deleted and the message 
sender is blocked. Based on second security requirement, the control activity of DB access 
is modeled, including DB access attempt found, DB access attempt is not found and 
Registration failed events; Control activity of DB access and Block DB access functions. If 
there is an attempt to access the database during the message handling process, it is 
blocked. In addition, control activity of DB access and reading inquiry message functions 
are concurrent to each other, this concurrency is presented with join and fork AND gates. 
The final security requirement leads us modeling the control of outgoing/sent information 
which consists of Traffic is safe, Traffic is not safe and Registration failed events; 
Outcoming traffic control and Stop the operation functions. This operation investigates if 
the response message is of the same length as it was initially defined by the system admin. 
If this check reports a problem, the system stops the message sending operation.  
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Figure 5.4 – Message Handling process including security requirements. 
 
5.1.6 Control Selection and Implementation 
 
The EPC application is typically performed at the business process management and 
modeling stages and implementation of the security requirements usually remains 
postponed for the later system development stages. However, it is important to make the 
security risk analysis and the modeling at together, otherwise, if the security risk analysis is 
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done after the business process modeling business analysts might have to change the whole 
model from the beginning, which causes loss of time and money. 
 
5.2 ISSRM and EPC Alignment  
 
The result of previous analysis is the semantic alignment between the EPC constructs and 
the concepts of the ISSRM domain model. A summary is given below including alignment 
which is shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Asset-related Concepts: As it is comprehensively described in section 5.1.1, all assets, 
business assets and information system assets in Table 5.1 are categorized. Event, 
Function, Organisation Unit, Resource Unit, Control Flow, Logical Operator, Information 
Flow, Assignment and Process Path constructs of EPC are considered as both business 
asset and IS asset of ISSRM domain model since these constructs are continuously used in 
the running example(s). In addition, the relationship between these constructs and Asset-
related concepts of ISSRM domain model is very strong because of the similarity between 
concept definitions and construct definitions.  
 
Risk-related Concepts: These concepts present how the risk itself can be defined and 
what major principles should be taken into account when defining the potential risks. 
Based on the running example and the wide explanations in risk analysis and assessment 
section, it is possible to illustrate the EPC constructs included risk scenario in the table 
only in Threat Agent and Attack Method parts. There are two threat agents in this level; 
Violator and Spy Program, and they both have different roles in different risks of different 
security levels. Threat agent concept is represented with the organisation unit construct 
whereas attack method is represented with the rest of the EPC constructs (Event, Function, 
Logical Operator, Resource Unit, Information Flow, Assignment, Control Flow, Process 
Path) since the organisation unit is the actor who uses all these constructs similarly threat 
agent performs the attack method.     
 
Risk Treatment-related concepts: These concepts describe the decisions that should be 
taken, and controls to be implemented in order to mitigate the identified risks during the 
risk analysis and assessment. As the running example and risk treatment methods are 
described in section 5.1.5, we only show in Table 5.1 which constructs are involved in the 
three different mitigation processes. All the EPC constructs (Event, Function, Organisation 
Unit, Logical Operator, Resource Unit, Information Flow, Assignment, Control Flow, 
Process Path) are clustered under the Security Requirement concept of ISSRM domain 
model since all the risk treatment process is done with these constructs by defining the 
security requirements.   
 
5.3 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have focused on the common characteristics of the EPC constructs and 
the ISSRM domain model concepts. After analyzing the similarities and common 
characteristics of the EPC constructs and the ISSRM concepts with the running examples, 
we align EPC and ISSRM in a table which presents alignment of the EPC constructs to the 
ISSRM conecpts, shown in Table 5.1. All EPC constructs are clustered under a specific 
ISSRM concept. The alignment process leads us to extend the EPC language and make it 
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more secure. The main challenge for the extension process is that to classify same 
constructs which are used and clustered under the different ISSRM concepts (e.g. Event, 
Function, Organisation Unit and so on). Further discussion and analysis are done in next 
chapter with the extension of the EPC language.   
 
Table 5.1 – Alignment of the EPC constructs to the ISSRM conecpts. 
The ISSRM 
Domain Model 
EPC Constructs Example 
A
ss
et
-R
el
at
ed
 C
on
ce
pt
s 
Asset - - 
Business 
Asset 
Event, Function, Organisation 
Unit, Resource Unit, Control 
Flow, Logical Operator, 
Information Flow, Assignment, 
Process Path 
Event[User wishes to register to the system] 
Organisation Unit[User] 
Function[User sends inquiry to system] 
Resource Unit[Inquiry Message] 
 
Organisation Unit[User] 
Function[User submits his data] 
Resource Unit[User Data] 
 
Organisation Unit[User] 
Function[User attempts to login] 
Resource Unit[Username & Password] 
IS Asset Event, Function, Organisation 
Unit, Resource Unit, Control 
Flow, Logical Operator, 
Information Flow, Assignment, 
Process Path 
Event[Positive demand for registration] 
Organisation Unit[Admin] 
Function[Inquiry message read by admin] 
Resource Unit[Inquiry Message] 
 
Organisation Unit[Admin] 
Function[Admin sends message back to user] 
Resource Unit[Approve  Message] 
 
Organisation Unit[Internet Store System (ISS)] 
Function[System stores username & password to 
DB] 
Resource Unit[User Data] 
 
Organisation Unit[ISS] 
Function[System checks the validity of username & 
password] 
Resource Unit[Username & Password] 
 
Event[Invalid username or password, Valid 
username & password] 
Organisation Unit[ISS] 
Function[System lets user login] 
Security 
Criterion 
-  Confidentiality of Username and 
Password (Business Resource Unit),  
 Integrity of Business Process Paths.  
R
is
k-
R
el
at
ed
 C
on
ce
pt
s 
Risk - - 
Impact -  Confidentiality of Username and 
Password is broken,  
 Integrity of functions and events is 
negated. 
Event - - 
Threat - A violator sends message containing a spy 
program. Later, the spy program extracts info from 
database and finally sends it back to the violator by 
attaching stolen data into approve message. 
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Vulnerability -  Message is being handled without any 
scanning,  
 The outgoing traffic is not monitored,  
 The access to DB is not controlled. 
Threat Agent Organisation Unit Organisation Unit [Violator] 
Organisation Unit [Spy Program] 
Attack 
Method 
Event, Function, Logical 
Operator, Resource Unit, 
Information Flow, Assignment, 
Control Flow, Process Path 
 A violator sends a message containing a 
spy program,  
 
Event[Violator wishes to register to the system] 
Function[Violator sends inquiry to the system with 
a spy program] 
Resource Unit[Inquiry Message + Spy program] 
 
 Spy program extracts info from database, 
 
Event[Execution of spy program starts, Data 
extraction succeeds] 
Function[Spy Program extracts data from DB] 
Resource Unit[Stolen Data] 
 
 Spy program sends it back to the violator 
by attaching stolen data into approve 
message. 
 
Event[Approve message modified by the spy 
program] 
Function[Spy Program attaches stolen data into 
approve message of admin] 
Resource Unit[Stolen data, Approve message + 
Stolen Data] 
R
is
k 
T
re
at
m
en
t-
R
el
at
ed
 C
on
ce
pt
s 
Risk 
Treatment 
- Risk Reduction 
Security 
Requirement 
Event, Function, Organisation 
Unit, Logical Operator, 
Resource Unit, Information 
Flow, Assignment, Control 
Flow, Process Path 
 Inquiry message scanning,  
Event[Scanning system activated, Message is not 
safe, Registration failed] 
Organisation Unit[Security System] 
Function[Message is scanned, System blocks user 
and deletes the message] 
Resource Unit[Inquiry message + potential spy 
program] 
 
 Database access control,  
Event[DB access attempt found, DB access attempt 
is not found, Registration failed] 
Organisation Unit[Security System] 
Function[Control activity of DB access, Block DB 
access] 
 
 Outgoing traffic control. 
Event[Traffic is safe, Traffic is not safe, 
Registration failed] 
Organisation Unit[Security System] 
Function[Outcoming traffic control, Stop the 
operation] 
Control - - 
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Chapter 6. SECURITY-ORIENTED EPC 
 
In this chapter, we develop syntactic, semantic and methodological extensions to Event-
driven Process Chain [25] that would support modeling security risks and their 
countermeasures. First, we analyse the extensions to the concrete syntax and then present 
how concrete syntax extensions are addressed in the abstract syntax. Next, methodological 
guidelines are defined, lastly, extensions with respect to Information System Security Risk 
Management domain model are defined. Security-Oriented EPC is obtained after the 
extensions in two different levels; high level and low level. The high level means less 
constructs since we only focus on “process path” construct of EPC. Process paths contain 
all other constructs in it like a cluster. Low level refers to more constructs since we focus 
on all contructs of EPC by ignoring the case “process path contains other constructs”. The 
main reason to make two different levels of analysis is to highlight the importance of the 
complexity of the EPC language. 
 
6.1 Higher-Level of Security Problem Definition  
 
The high level extension process is done in two main parts: Concrete Syntax and Abstract 
Syntax by analyzing the constructs of the model. 
 
6.1.1 Concrete Syntax in High Level 
 
In section 5.2, during the alignment of EPC and ISSRM, the concrete syntax of EPC is 
analysed according to the three categories: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and 
risk treatment-related concepts. In Figure 6.1, 6.3 and 6.5, constructs of EPC are 
categorized according to the ISSRM concepts and showed separately according to their 
usage in the model. Besides, in these figures the ISSRM relationships are also expressed (if 
possible) with EPC. In this section we focus on the higher level problem definition by 
using the process path construct(s).  
 
Asset-related Concepts: 
 
As it is seen in Figure 6.1 both Business Asset (red) and IS Asset (green) have their own 
Process Paths. Based on ISSRM domain model, we extended the EPC language with new 
relationships and constructs in high level. These relationships are Supports (with Control 
Flow in high level, with Control Flow and Event in low level) and EPC-Constraint of. The 
new construct is EPC-Security Criterion and all these new constructs and relationships are 
illustrated in the example in Figure 6.2. 
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ISSRM Type EPC 
Constructs Concrete Syntax 
Asset C - - 
IS Asset C Control Flow, 
Process Path 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Asset 
C 
Supports R Relations: 
Control Flow 
 
Security 
Criterion 
C EPC–Security 
Criterion 
 
Constraint 
of 
C, R Relations: 
EPC–Constraint 
of 
 
Figure 6.1 – Asset-related (C)oncepts and (R)elationships.   
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Process Path and IS Process Path including new constructs EPC – Security Criterion and 
EPC – Constraint of. 
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Risk-related Concepts: 
 
In Risk-related concepts we also have new relationships and new constructs as shown in 
Figure 6.3. Again we classified these relationships, constructs and their connections 
between each other based on ISSRM domain model. 
 
ISSRM Type EPC 
Constructs Concrete Syntax 
Threat Agent C - - 
Attack 
Method 
C - - 
Uses R - - 
Threat C Process Path  
Vulnerability C EPC–
Vulnerability 
 
Exploits C, R Relations: EPC–
Exploits 
 
Characteristic 
of 
C, R Relations: EPC–
Characteristic of 
 
Targets R Relations: Control 
Flow 
 
Event C (Process Path) + 
(EPC–Exploits) + 
(EPC–
Vulnerability) 
 
 
 
 
Impact C EPC–Impact  
Harms C, R Relations: EPC–
Harms  
Leads to/ 
Negates 
C, R Relations: EPC–
Leads to/Negates  
Risk C (Process Path) + 
(EPC–Exploits) + 
(EPC–
Vulnerability) + 
(EPC–Impact) + 
(EPC–Harms) + 
(EPC–Leads 
to/Negates) 
 
Significance 
Assessed by 
R - - 
Figure 6.3 – Risk- related (C)oncepts and (R)elationships. 
 
Risk-related process is included in the Business Asset level as it can be seen in the Figure 
6.4. Threat Process Path targets (with Control Flow) the IS Asset Process Path (which has 
a Vulnerability). Vulnerability is connected to the IS Asset Process Path with EPC-
Characteristic of and threat Process Path exploits the Vulnerability with EPC-Exploits. 
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Besides, the Vulnerability leads to an impact and negates the security criterion with the 
new construct EPC-Leads to/Negates and from this construct a branch called EPC-Harms 
goes to the IS Asset Process Path which indicates the harm and its impact definition with 
the EPC-Impact. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Process Path, IS Asset Process Path and Risk Process Path including new constructs 
EPC – Security Criterion, EPC – Constraint of, EPC – Exploits, EPC – Vulnerability, EPC 
– Harms, EPC – Impact, EPC – Characteristic of and EPC – Leads to/Negates. 
 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts:  
 
The last extended and analysed concept is Risk Treatment-related concepts. Here also there 
is a new Process Path shown in Figure 6.5 which characterize the treatment functionality 
and, in general, mitigates the vulnerability of the IS Asset in the Control level. 
 
ISSRM Type EPC 
Constructs Concrete Syntax 
Risk 
Treatment 
C - - 
Decision to 
Treat 
R - - 
Security 
Requirement 
C - - 
Control C Control Flow, 
Process Path 
 
Refines R - - 
Mitigates C, R Relations: EPC–
Mitigates 
 
Implements R - - 
Figure 6.5 – Risk treatment-related (C)oncepts and (R)elationships. 
 
The Risk Treatment-related process is included to the system right after Business Asset or 
Risk-related process level as it is illustrated in Figure 6.6 and 6.7. All in all, control 
Process Path mitigates the IS Asset Vulnerability with the new construct EPC-Mitigates. 
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Once the Vulnerability is mitigated, all other Risk-related concepts are also ignored and the 
system is safe now. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Process Path, IS Asset Process Path, Risk Process Path and Risk Treatment Process 
Path including new constructs EPC – Security Criterion, EPC – Constraint of, EPC – 
Exploits, EPC – Vulnerability, EPC – Harms, EPC – Impact, EPC – Characteristic of, EPC 
– Leads to/Negates and EPC – Mitigates. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Process Path, IS Asset Process Path, Risk Process Path and Risk Treatment Process 
Path including new constructs EPC – Security Criterion, EPC – Constraint of, EPC – 
Exploits, EPC – Vulnerability, EPC – Harms, EPC – Impact, EPC – Characteristic of, EPC 
– Leads to/Negates and EPC – Mitigates. 
 
60 
 
 
Figure 6.8 – Abstract Syntax of Extended EPC with Process Path and ISSRM Domain 
Model. 
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6.1.2 Abstract Syntax in High Level 
 
In previous sections abstract syntax of EPC has not been presented due to the need of the 
simple introduction of the language itself. However, to illustrate how the proposed 
syntactic EPC extensions are used, we need to present abstract syntax elements and the 
rules how they can be combined together.  
 
The abstrax syntax of Security-Oriented EPC is illustrated in a model. The model we 
obtained is called The Security Enhanced Model with Process Paths shown in Figure 6.8. 
The model is based on the ISSRM domain model concepts, these concepts’ relationships to 
each other and on the other side the EPC meta-model constructs (only Process Path) and 
the associations of these constructs between each other. 
 
6.2 Lower-Level of Security Problem Definition 
 
In this section we focus on the main constructs of the EPC language except process path. 
Here also we extend the language in two parts; concrete syntax and abstract syntax.  
 
6.2.1 Concrete Syntax in Low Level 
 
In low level also the concrete syntax of EPC is analysed according to the three construct 
categories: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk treatment-related 
concepts. In Figure 6.1, 6.3 and 6.5, high level constructs (Process Path level) of EPC are 
categorized according to the ISSRM concepts and showed separately according to their 
usage in the model. In this section we analyse low level construct extensions in Figure 
6.10, 6.13 and 6.15. 
 
Asset-related Concepts:  
 
In this section we focus on the constructs in low level, which means we will show the 
extended relationships and constructs with usual EPC constructs, not with Process Paths. 
As all the constructs are classified in Figure 6.10, now we start analyzing the example in 
Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.11 and see the differences between low level and high level 
extensions. In Figure 6.9 and 6.11 Security-Oriented EPC asset constructs are illustrated in 
lower level. Extended constutc Security Criterion and EPC-Constraint of are also shown in 
these figures.  
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Figure 6.9 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Constructs and IS Asset Constructs including new constructs EPC – Security 
Criterion and EPC – Constraint of. 
 
ISSRM Type EPC 
Constructs Concrete Syntax 
Asset C - - 
 
IS Asset C Event, 
Function, 
Organisation 
Unit, Resource 
Unit, 
Information 
Flow, Control 
Flow, Logical 
Operator, 
Assignment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Asset 
C 
Supports R Relations: 
Control Flow, 
Event 
 
Security 
Criterion 
C EPC–Security 
Criterion 
 
Constraint 
of 
C, R Relations: 
EPC–Constraint 
of 
 
Figure 6.10 – Asset-related (C)oncepts and (R)elationships. 
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Figure 6.11 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Constructs and IS Asset Constructs including new constructs EPC – Security 
Criterion and EPC – Constraint of. 
 
Risk-related Concepts: 
 
In Risk-related concepts, we have the similar relationships and constructs that we have 
extended in higher-level, shown in Figure 6.13. We will just indicate which low level 
construct will be connected to each other, this is important because we use this information 
when we define the abstract syntax of the extensions. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Constructs, IS Asset Constructs and Risk Constructs including new constructs EPC – 
Security Criterion, EPC – Constraint of, EPC – Exploits, EPC – Vulnerability, EPC – 
Harms, EPC – Impact, EPC – Characteristic of and EPC – Leads to/Negates. 
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ISSRM Type EPC 
Constructs Concrete Syntax 
Threat Agent C Organisation Unit  
Attack 
Method 
C Event, Function, 
Resource Unit, 
Information Flow, 
Control Flow, 
Logical Operator 
 
 
 
Uses R Relations: 
Assignment 
 
Threat C Event, Function, 
Resource Unit, 
Information Flow, 
Control Flow, 
Logical Operator, 
Organisation Unit  
 
Vulnerability C EPC–
Vulnerability 
 
Exploits C, R Relations: EPC–
Exploits 
 
Characteristic 
of 
C, R Relations: EPC–
Characteristic of 
 
Targets R Relations: Control 
Flow 
 
Event C (Function) + 
(EPC–Exploits) + 
(EPC–
Vulnerability) + 
(Event) + 
(Resource Unit) + 
(Org. Unit) 
 
 
 
 
Impact C EPC–Impact 
 
Harms C, R Relations: EPC–
Harms  
Leads to/ 
Negates 
C, R Relations: EPC–
Leads to/Negates  
Risk C (Function) + 
(EPC–Exploits) + 
(EPC–
Vulnerability) + 
(Event) + 
(Resource Unit) + 
(Org. Unit) + 
(EPC–Impact) + 
(EPC–Harms) + 
(EPC–Leads 
to/Negates) 
 
Significance 
Assessed by 
R - - 
Figure 6.13 – Risk-related (C)oncepts and (R)elationships. 
 
In Figure 6.12, the constructs of the attack method are included in the same level with 
Business Asset constructs. Briefly, the Supports relationship between Business Asset and 
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IS Asset this time is provided by only Control Flow because in risk level we assume that 
Event is part of IS Asset and also attack method Function targets the IS Asset Event. Next, 
attack method Function exploits the Vulnerability with EPC-Exploits, and Vulnerability is 
characteristic of IS Asset Event and they are connected to each other with EPC-
Characteristic of. Vulnerability leads to/negates the EPC-Security Criterion with EPC-
Leads to/Negates and again a branch connected to the EPC-Leads to/Negates called EPC-
Harms targets the IS Asset Resource Unit and this branch has also the EPC-Impact 
construct which gives information about the impact.   
 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts: 
 
In Risk Treatment-related concepts of low level, the important connections between 
constructs are; Business Asset Function Supports and Threat Function Targets the Control 
Event with a Control Flow, and Control Function mitigates the EPC-Vulnerability with 
EPC-Mitigates as we can see from Figure 6.14. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 – Part of Registration and Login to Internet Store example shown in Business 
Asset Constructs, IS Asset Constructs, Risk Constructs and Risk Treatment Constructs 
including new constructs EPC – Security Criterion, EPC – Constraint of, EPC – Exploits, 
EPC – Vulnerability, EPC – Harms, EPC – Impact, EPC – Characteristic of, EPC – Leads 
to/Negates and EPC – Mitigates. 
 
6.2.2 Abstract Syntax in Low Level 
 
The first model we obtained during the higher level abstract definition was called The 
Security Enhanced Model with Process Paths shown in Figure 6.8. The second model is 
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called The Security Enhanced Model with Subconstructs is shown in Figure 6.16. The 
model is based on the ISSRM domain model concepts, these concepts’ relationships to 
each other and on the other side the EPC meta-model constructs (not including Process 
Path) and the associations of these constructs between each other. 
 
ISSRM Type EPC 
Constructs Concrete Syntax 
Risk 
Treatment 
C - - 
Decision to 
Treat 
R - - 
Control C - - 
Security 
Requirement 
C Event, Function, 
Organisation 
Unit, Resource 
Unit, 
Information 
Flow, Control 
Flow, Logical 
Operator, 
Assignment 
 
 
Refines R - - 
Mitigates C, R Relations: EPC–
Mitigates 
 
Implements R - - 
Figure 6.15 – Risk Treatment-related (C)oncepts and (R)elationships. 
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Figure 6.16 – Abstract Syntax of Extended EPC with Constructs and ISSRM Domain 
Model. 
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6.3 Extended Meta-Model of Security-Oriented EPC 
 
In previous sections we have extended the EPC language in Risk/Security oriented way. In 
the end we have obtained two abstrax syntaxes, one based on high level with Process 
Paths, the other based on low level with other sub constructs. If we combine these two 
abstrax syntaxes on the EPC meta-model template, we gain the below model in Figure 6.17 
which can be called as the Security-Oriented Meta-Model of EPC or Abstrax Syntax of 
Security-Oriented EPC. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 – Abstract Syntax of Extended EPC aka Security-Oriented EPC. 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
The question “Why do we need to use Security-Oriented EPC in Business Modeling?” rises 
explicitly after the syntactic and symantic extensions of the language. Many business 
process modelers might want to ignore the security extensions due to avoiding the 
complexity. At this point, we need to introduce the solution with purpose in order to 
disprove the main idea “There is no mean to do security analysis in business process 
modeling”. 
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Figure 6.18 – Three steps of the guidelines to use Security-Oriented EPC. 
 
In conclusion, the guidelines to use Security-Oriented EPC could be defined in three steps 
in order to point out the significance of security needs during the business process 
modeling. The first step is basically the main business process model and we just analyse, 
as a security risk analyser, and find out the parts of the model where security requirements 
might be defined. To do this in first operation we just identify the security criterion(s).  
 
During the second step we start editing the existing model by introducing the extended 
EPC, defining security requirement(s) and how security criterion(s) is fulfilled by the 
defined security requirement(s). In the end, the third step is to analyse the metrics of the 
extended constructs and based on these metrics find the result(s) how the system is treated 
and what would the cost be. Third step will also lead us to analyse the return on security 
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investment which will answer the question “Why do we need to use Security-Oriented EPC 
in Business Modeling?”. Figure 6.18 illustrates the architecture of these three steps. We 
have already analysed all three steps in previous sections. We will focus on step three 
deeper in following chapter(s).     
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Chapter 7. MEASURING SECURITY RISKS USING 
SECURITY-ORIENTED EPC 
 
In this chapter we define metrics of security-oriented EPC. Metrics are important during 
the calculation of return on investment (ROI [27]). We will use metrics with a scenario in 
our Internet Store running example and later will measure the security risks and calculate 
the cost on the treatment and return on security investment (ROSI [27]).    
 
7.1 Metrics Definitions for Security-Oriented EPC 
 
We first present and then use the predefined ISSRM metrics definitions in order to define 
the metics values in our extended EPC language. We use this method because in our 
previous analysis during the all extension process, we chose ISSRM as basis. The metrics 
analysis table for ISO/IEC 27005 [26] is shown below.  
 
By considering the Table 7.1, we can start analyzing the extended abstract syntaxes of EPC 
language in low level (based on usual constructs) and high level (based on Process Path), 
due to the fact that in previous chapter we have combined the EPC meta-model and 
ISSRM domain model and this approach will help us during the metrics analysis. 
 
Table 7.1 – Metric Analysis Table for ISO/IEC 27005 [26]. 
ISSRM Concept Concept Metric ISSRM Metric 
Asset Asset Value - 
Business Asset Primary Asset Value Value 
IS Asset Supporting Asset - - 
Risk Risk Risk Level Risk Level 
Event Event Likelihood Potentiality 
Impact Consequence Business Impact Value Impact Level 
Threat Threat Frequency of 
Occurence 
Likelihood 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Easiness of 
Exploitation 
Vulnerability Level 
Security 
Requirement 
Control 
Control Effectiveness Risk Reduction 
 
As an initialization, let’s start with high level abstract syntax metrics analysis. Compared 
to the low level model we have less constructs in high level abstract model. However, the 
metrics analysis of new constructs which are defined by us in the extended EPC won’t 
change in both models, since the main difference between two models is that in high level 
model we show the constructs in abstract level with Process Paths.  
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Figure 7.1 – High Level Security-Oriented EPC Abstract Syntax enriched with Metrics. 
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Figure 7.2 – Low Level Security-Oriented EPC Abstract Syntax enriched with Metrics. 
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In particular, if we start with Business Asset cluster in Figure 6.8 in Chapter 6, it is 
possible to say that Business Process Path in that cluster is a primary asset and its metric 
can be defined as “Value”. As another instance, we can define the metric of the EPC-
Impact construct as “Impact Level” because it exists in the Impact cluster. Similarly, we 
define all the metrics of the constructs of high level abstract syntax according to the Table 
7.1, and in the end we obtain a new meta-model which is called as “High Level Security-
Oriented EPC Abstract Syntax enriched with Metrics.” and shown in Figure 7.1. On the 
other hand, since we do not have a unique construct which refers to Event concept of the 
ISSRM domain model (see Figure 6.3 in Chapter 6), we can not match the “Potentiality” 
metric with any of our EPC constructs. Same consequence is applicable for the Risk 
concept.         
 
Similarly, we can define the metrics in low level abstract syntax as well (see Chapter 6, 
Figure 6.16). The only difference is that we have to define which construct is related with 
the metric. In high level construct (Process Path level) we defined the metrics inside the 
Process Path classes in Figure 7.1. In Figure 7.2 we define the metrics in the class of 
Process Element since all other constructs are subclasses of Process Element. In next 
sections we will define how the metrics value, cost or level be separated inside the 
constructs. 
 
7.2 Return on Security Investment (ROSI) of Security-Oriented EPC 
 
The definition of Return on Security Investment is the following: ROSI = monetary risk 
mitigation − cost of control. Therefore, a security investment is judged to be profitable, if 
the risk mitigation effect is greater than the expected costs [27]. 
 
Evaluation of the ISSRM Metrics 
 
This section is dedicated to the experimentation of the ISSRM metrics on our business case 
in order to analyse all the security requierements and in the end calculate the Return on 
Security Investment of our case. 
 
Process and Approach 
 
The process followed is based on the ISO/IEC 27005 standard, which provides guidelines 
for performing security risk management. As seen in previous section, the ISO/IEC 27005 
standard promotes the use of metrics. In our case we try to adapt and complete these 
metrics with regards to the Online Internet Store System. We will consider the case in 
Figure 7.3, the first attack of the violator, afterwards we will analyse the metrics on 
different constructs in order to calculate the ROSI. 
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Figure 7.3 – Inquiry by user (Business Asset), Scanning of the inquiry message (Risk-
treatment), Attack of the violator with a spy program attached to the inquiry message 
(Risk), Inquiry accepted and read by admin (IS Asset). 
 
Context and Assets Identification 
 
In this step, the assets of Internet Store System are identified. We first analyse what the 
business assets of the organization are, later, based on the inventory of the IS assets we 
map each IS asset to its related business asset(s). 
 
Table 7.2 – Business and IS Assets of Internet Store System Inquiry sending process. 
Business Assets Organisation Unit[User], Function[User sends inquiry], 
Resource Unit[Inquiry Message], Event[User wishes to 
register] 
IS Assets Organisation Unit[Admin], Event[Inquiry accepted], 
Function[Inquiry message read], Resource Unit[Inquiry 
Message] 
 
According the business asset value metrics identification, we should focus on the 
importance and privacy of the inquiry message (resource unit). When user is registering to 
the system, he/she might enter a lot of private information with inquiry message, or vice 
versa. Based on this situation our values, costs, are defined in Table 7.3.  
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Table 7.3 – Qualitative scale of value for the value of business assets. 
 
Security Objectives Determination 
 
In this step, we analyse the security criterion for the business asset. As it can be seen from 
the Figure 7.3, our security criterion and related constructs are defined on the following 
tables. 
 
Table 7.4 – Security Criterion of the Internet Store System Inquiry Sending process. 
Security 
Criterion 
EPC – Constraint of, EPC – Security 
Criterion[Integrity of Inquiry] 
 
As we defined in the previous chapters, there are three important concepts in security 
criterion part; Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. In our case, we consider the all 
possible security need for the related security risk. To do this, we analyse these three 
factors in different levels. Table 7.5 clearly identifies the levels of the security need and 
their effects on the business asset. During our analysis, we choose which level of security 
need(s) has to be assured. 
 
Table 7.5 – Qualitative scale of value for the security need metric. 
Security Objective 
Security Need for Inquiry Message Information 
 Need for Confidentiality Need for Integrity Need for Availability 
0 No need of 
confidentiality 
No need of integrity No need of availability 
1 Disclosure of the 
information restricted to 
the Internet Store System  
- Disruption only internal to 
Internet Store system 
2 Disclosure of the 
information restricted to 
the Internet Store System 
and its users 
Modifications that does not 
influence the user 
registration and login 
Disruption with minor 
effect on users 
3 Disclosure of the 
information restricted to 
Internet Store System 
Users 
Modifications that 
influences the user 
registration and login 
Disruption with major 
effect on users 
 
Business Asset Value 
Inquiry Message Information 
Value Estimate Approx. Value Description 
High € 20.000 Inquiry message contains a lot of private 
information 
Normal € 10.000 Inquiry message contains few private 
information 
Low € 4.000 Inquiry message contains almost no private 
information 
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Risk Analysis and Assessment 
 
Once security needs of assets are defined for each security criterion, we analyse the risks. 
We first start by identifying the threats relevant to the IS. We analyse all the Security Risk 
related constructs in Table 7.6. Accordingly, we identify the likelihood of the threat in our 
system. Likelihood identification is done in Table 7.7. The lower level of likelihood 
represents a more secure system. 
 
Table 7.6 – Risk related constructs in Internet Store System Inquiry sending process. 
Threat Agent Organisation Unit[Violator] 
Attack Method Function[Violator sends inquiry with spy program], Event[Violator 
wishes to register system], Resource Unit[Inquiry message + Spy 
program] 
Vulnerability EPC-Vulnerability 
Impact EPC-Impact 
Threat Attack Method + Threat Agent 
Event Threat (Attack Method + Threat Agent) + Vulnerability 
Risk Event (Threat + Vulnerability) + Impact 
 
Table 7.7 – Qualitative scale of value for the likelihood metric. 
Likelihood that the violator will try to register to the Internet Store 
System 
Level Description 
1 Unlikely according to statistics 
2 Can happen at most 4 times in a year 
3 Can happen more than 4 times in a year 
 
Threats are associated with some vulnerabilities that are exploited by the threat for the risk 
to take place effectively. Once again, the vulnerabilities are identified through a 
brainstorming with some key actors of the organisation and then complemented by an 
analysis of the available knowledge bases. In Table 7.8, vulnerability levels and 
descriptions are clarified for the Internet Store System Inquiry process. 
 
Table 7.8 – Qualitative scale of value for the vulnerability level metric. 
Level of Vulnerability check Internet Store System accepts Inquiries 
Level Description 
0 Very Low – security measures in place and so far no threat has happened 
1 Medium – security measures in place (but once a threat has happened) 
2 High – no effective security measures in system (approx. 4 attacks per year 
succeeded)  
3 Very High – extremely inadequate security measures (not applied or expired) 
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Table 7.9 – Risk matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact level is directly related with the potentiality. It is necessary to make such 
calculation assumptions for determining the risk level, and determining the risk level is a 
must for the certification. Then a risk matrix is created, in Table 7.9. This risk matrix 
indicated the risk level, based on the potentiality and the maximum impact level of the 
concerned impacts for the studies business assets. 
 
Potentiality = likelihood + vulnerability level – 1 
 
Risk Level 
 
In our case, likelihood is high level since we assume that the Violator attempted to register 
to the system five times in a year, which is more than four. In this case, vulnerability level 
is also high as we can see from the Table 7.8. Also we only take into account the integrity 
of the inquiry message since there is not such related security criterion about 
confidentiality or availability of inquiry message. Consequently: 
 
Table 7.10 – Risk level calculation table. 
Business Asset Inquiry Message Information 
Security Need C = 0 I = 3 A = 0 
Threat Likelihood Can happen more than 4 times 
in a year 
3 
Vulnerability Vulnerability 
Level 
System is very vulnerable due 
to the lack of security 
requirements  
3 
Risk Level RL 
 
Since; Potentiality = likelihood + vulnerability level – 1, 
 
Considering our business asset, Potentiality = 3 + 3 – 1 = 5, 
  
Where our Impact Level is 3 and RL (Risk Level) is 15 (see Table 7.9). 
 
Risk Treatment Decisions 
 
For each risk, it is now necessary to choose a suited risk treatment and associated security 
requirements. In our method based on ISO/IEC 27005, each risk having a level inferior to 
the risk acceptance level is systematically accepted. If the risk level was superior to the risk 
acceptance level, it is necessary to reduce, transfer or avoid the risk.  
 
 
Potentiality 
Impact Level 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 
 3 0 3 6 9 12 15 
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Table 7.11 – Risk treatment methods and their descriptions. 
Risk Treatment 
Decisions 
Definition 
Risk Reduction Action to lessen the probability, negative consequences, or 
both, associated with a risk 
Risk Avoidence Decision not to be involved in, or to withdraw from a risk 
Risk Transfer Sharing with another party the burden of loss for a risk 
Risk Retain Accepting the burden of loss from a risk 
 
Table 7.12 – Security Requirements Definition 
Risk Tretment Risk Reduction 
Security 
Requirements 
Function[Message scanning], Event[Scanning system 
activated], Organisation Unit[Security system], Resource 
Unit[Inquiry message + Potential spy program], 
Function[Block user and delete inquiry message] 
Control Implementing and adding a message scanning functionality 
to the system (effectiveness assumption 80%)  
 
Considering our security requirements definitions, received inquiry message is scanned in 
order to clarify if it includes a spy program or not, if spy program is detected, then security 
system blocks the user and deletes the inquiry message. However, in some circumstances 
the spy program is attached to the inquiry message so professionally that scanning system 
can not detect the threat (the case of 80% effectiveness). 
 
Control Selection and Implementations 
 
Table 7.13 – Risk assessment and treatment table. 
Risk Treatment Risk Reduction by introducing the 
new additional scanning security 
system (which has approx. 80% 
effectiveness) to the system  
Security 
Requirement 
New 
Vunerability 
Level 
Scan all messages 
and block approx. 
80% of them 
which include spy 
program 
1 (80% 
effectiveness 
reduced the 
threat to once 
in a year) 
New Risk Level 9 
Risk Reduction 6 
 
As we can see from the Table 7.13, after implementing the scanning security system we 
reduced the risk level to 9. Since we have calculated the risk reduction, in our case we can 
now calculate the ROSI:  
 
Cost of implementing additional scanning system for the incoming inquiry messages is 
€15.000.  
 
ROSI = {[(Risk Exposure * Risk Mitigated) – Solution Cost] / Solution Cost} * 100% 
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Risk Exposure = 5 * 20.000 = € 100.000 
 
Risk Mitigated = Risk Reduction / Risk Level = 6/15 
 
Solution Cost = € 15.000 
 
ROSI (Scanning Module Implementation) = 167% 
 
7.3 Summary 
 
Return on security investment (ROSI) has been difficult to calculate successfully. In the 
absence of actual data on the number of incidents, organisations are often forced to make 
estimates. Also, the impact of an individual incident can be difficult to assess. In this 
chapter we have analysed the Security-Oriented EPC with ISSRM metrics defined in [26]. 
The purpose of this analysis is to understand how the return on security investment (ROSI) 
of extended EPC could be calculated. As a result, we can say that extended EPC helps to 
measure the risk. Because by the ROSI calculation we analysed the cost with a security 
requirement definition and with a solution cost of € 15.000 the system gets return on 
investment the percentage of 167. Which means that with that price risk reduction can be 
achieved in high level.  
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Chapter 8. TRANSFORMATION GUIDELINES FROM 
SECURITY-ORIENTED EPC TO MAL-ACTIVITY 
DIAGRAMS 
 
In this chapter we will define transformation rules from Security-Oriented EPC to Mal-
Activity Diagrams with a running example by using the alignment of the languages with 
ISSRM domain model. MAD is chosen for the transformation process since conclusion of 
Chapter 3 and alignment of MAD with ISSM in Chapter 4 showed us that MAD is a highly 
security-oriented modeling language and it will be suitable during the generation of 
construct-based transformation rules.      
 
Table 8.1 shows the alignment between ISSRM, Security-Oriented EPC and Mal-activity 
Diagrams. Security-Oriented EPC column is based on the alignment table we have 
obtained in chapter five, and Mal-activity Diagram column belongs to [28]. 
 
We use our running example (online registration to internet store) in three different levels 
of ISSRM concepts; Asset-related, Risk-related and Risk Treatment-related, and illustrate 
the Security-Oriented EPC and MAD models in order to identify the similarities and 
transformation rules between Security-Oriented EPC and MAD. 
 
8.1 Asset-related Transformation 
 
During the asset-related transformations we focus on the constructs and relationships 
which we defined as an asset in previous chapters. The running example is the one which 
we used during the alignment and EPC language extention processes. Our running example 
can shortly be described as, user wishes to register to the system and sends inquiry to the 
system, when inquiry message is accepted by system it is handled and read by admin. As 
you can see in the Figure 8.1, since we use the Security-Oriented EPC, we can notice the 
extended constructs “Security Criterion” and “EPC-Constraint of”. All other constructs are 
the main constructs (Event, Function, Organisation Unit, Resource Unit, Control Flow and 
Information Flow) of EPC. 
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Table 8.1 – Alignment of the ISSRM Concepts and the Security-Oriented EPC and MAD 
Constructs. 
ISSRM Model ID Security-Oriented EPC Mal-activity 
Diagrams 
A
ss
et
 
Asset a - - 
Business Asset b (B) Event, Function, Organisation Unit, 
Information Flow, Control Flow, Logical 
Operator, Resource Unit, Assignment 
Activity, Decision, 
ControlFlow, 
Swimlane 
IS Asset c (IS) Event, Function, Organisation Unit, 
Information Flow, Control Flow, Logical 
Operator, Resource Unit, Assignment 
Swimlane, 
Activity, Decision, 
ControlFlow  
Supports r7 Control Flow ControlFlow 
Security Criterion d EPC-Security Criterion MAD-Security 
Criterion Constraint of r8 EPC-Constraint of 
R
is
k 
Risk e Combination of Event and Impact 
constructs  
Combination of 
Event and Impact 
constructs 
Impact f EPC-Impact Mal-activities 
Event g Combination of Vulnerability and Threat 
constructs 
Combination of 
Vulnerability and 
Threat constructs 
Exploits r4 EPC-Exploits - 
Characteristic of r9 EPC-Characteristic of MAD-
Vulnerability Vulnerability h EPC-Vulnerability 
Targets r5 Control Flow ControlFlow 
Threat i Combination of Attack Method and Threat 
Agent constructs 
Combination of 
Attack Method and 
Threat Agent 
constructs 
Significance assessed 
by 
r12 - - 
Harms r6 EPC-Harms - 
Threat Agent j Organisation Unit Mal-swimlane 
Leads to / Negates r1 EPC-Leads to / Negates Negates 
Uses r3 Assignment Swimlane contains 
Mal-Activity 
Attack Method k (Risk) Event, Function, Resource Unit, 
Information Flow, Control Flow, Logical 
Operator 
Mal-activities, 
Mal-decision, 
ControlFlow, Mal-
swimlane 
R
is
k
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
Risk Treatment l - - 
Security Requirement m (RT) Event, Function, Resource Unit, 
Organisation Unit, Information Flow, 
Control Flow, Logical Operator, 
Assignment  
MitigationActivity, 
Decision, 
Swimlane, 
ControlFlow 
Mitigates r2 EPC-Mitigates MitigationLink 
Control n - Swimlane 
Refines r10 - - 
Implements r11 - - 
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Figure 8.1 – Security-Oriented EPC diagram of online registration (message handling) of 
the Internet Store. 
 
Similarly, we model the MAD of the running example based on the same scenario. The 
main difference is the concrete syntax of the languages. In order to reduce this difference, 
we define transformation rules which will help us to transform a model from Security-
Oriented EPC model to MAD.  
 
 
Figure 8.2 – Mal-Activity Diagram of online registration (message handling) of the 
Internet Store. 
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Transformation rules for Asset-related transforming: 
 
TR1 = From Organisation Unit to Swimlane 
 Transformation rule one is based on ID-c in Table 8.1. Refers to IS Asset; e.g. 
Admin ↔ Admin. The purpose and the characteristics of these two constructs are 
very similar. The only difference is that in MAD the Swimlane construct includes 
all other constructs in it, acts like a cluster which includes the whole operation in it 
whereas the Organisation Unit in EPC is just connected to a Function. Therefore, 
the example below indicates the IS asset since the „Admin“ in our scenario is an IS 
asset.   
 
 
 
 Transformation rule one is also based on ID-b in Table 8.1. Refers to Business 
Asset; e.g. User ↔ User. Similar to the previous example, the example below 
indicates the Business asset since the „User“ in our scenario us a Business asset.   
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TR2 = From EPC-Security Criterion + EPC-Constraint of to MAD-Security Criterion 
 Transformation rule two is based on ID-d and ID-r8. Refers to Security Criterion 
concept and „Constraint of“ relationship; e.g. Integrity of Inquiry ↔ Integrity of 
Inquiry Message. The only difference between EPC-Security Criterion and MAD-
Security Criterion is that they are linked to the different constructs. EPC-Security 
Criterion is an extended construct and it is linked to the Resource Unit with another 
extended construct called EPC-Constraint of whereas the MAD-Security Criterion 
is linked to an Activity as we can see in Figure 8.2.  
 
 
 
TR3 = From Event + Function + Control Flow to Activity 
 Transformation rule three is based on ID-b. Refers to Business Asset; e.g. „User 
wishes to register“ and „User sends inquiry“ and Control Flow ↔ User sends 
inquiry message to admin in order to register. The transformation can not be done 
one-to-one constructs since in EPC the main process is divided into three parts, 
Event, Control Flow and Function. In particular, in MAD there aren’t any 
constructs which clarifies the purpose or preliminary phase of the Activity. Example 
below indicates the business asset since the process is performed by user. Also, in 
MAD, an Activity is followed by another Activity or Decision. 
 
 
 
 Transformation rule three is based on ID-c. Refers to IS Asset; e.g. „Inquiry 
accepted“ and Control Flow and „Inquiry message is read by admin“ ↔ Inquiry 
message is read by admin. Similar to the previous example, here we show the 
example of IS asset since these processes are performed by admin in system side.  
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TR4 = From Resource Unit + Information Flow to ControlFlow 
 Transformation rule four is based on ID-b. Refers to Business Asset; e.g. „Inquiry 
Message“ and Information Flow ↔ ControlFlow with a message. This 
transformation is little bit different then others and we have to consider two cases 
(Business asset and IS asset) since in MAD we do not show the same construct in 
different Swimlanes separately, instead, the construct is owned by both of the 
Swimlanes. On the other hand, in EPC, we can show the same construct in different 
levels of users. As illustrated in the below example, the Resource Unit  which is 
connected to a Function with an Information Flow is transformed to the 
ControlFlow which appears in „User“ Swimlane in our scenario, on the Business 
asset side. Besides, here ControlFlow is connected to Activity in MAD.   
  
 
 
 Transformation rule four is based on ID-c. Refers to IS Asset; e.g. „Inquiry 
Message“ and Information Flow ↔ ControlFlow with a message. Similarly, the 
example below analyses the same case in IS asset side since the Resource Unit 
shown below is connected to the Function which is performed by admin and the 
ControlFlow (in MAD diagram) appears in admin Swimlane. In particular, the 
ControlFlow acts as a single construct lying in two Swimlanes according to our 
scenario.   
 
 
 
TR5 = From Control Flow to ControlFlow 
 Transformation rule five is based on ID-r7. Refers to „Supports“ relationship. As 
we discussed in previous chapters, Control Flow in EPC acts like a support 
construct between IS asset and Business asset. Basically, the flow continues from 
IS asset to Business asset with a Control Flow. Similarly, in MAD, ControlFlow 
construct has the same role. When the process flows from one Swimlane to another 
one, support relationship is provided by ControlFlow construct. 
    
 
87 
 
8.2 Risk-related Transformation 
 
During the risk-related transformations we focus on the constructs and relationships which 
we defined as risk in previous chapters. The running example is same but the difference is 
that the “Violator” as a threat is included and we represent the “Risk” constructs which are 
shown in red in Figure 8.3. White constructs represents “Asset” concept. The extended 
constructs (EPC-Vulnerability, EPC-Impact and so on) are also shown in Figure 8.3. 
Basically, Violator sends inquiry which includes a spy program and the inquiry message is 
accepted by the system without any scan, which causes an impact on the integrity of 
inquiry message of user, because the inquiry message contains important data of the user. 
The same scenario is illustrated in Figure 8.4 with MAD. 
 
Transformation rules for Risk-related transforming: 
 
TR6 = From EPC-Vulnerability + EPC-Characteristic of to MAD-Vulnerability 
 Transformation rule six is based on ID-h and ID-r9. Refers to Vulnerability 
concept and „Characteristic of“ relationship; e.g. Message is being handled without 
any scanning ↔ Message is handled without scanning. The point we need to 
consider is that MAD-Vulnerability is connected to a ControlFlow on IS asset side 
whereas EPC-Vulnerability is connected (with EPC-Characteristic of) to an Event 
of the admin which is an IS Organisation Unit.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 – Security-Oriented EPC diagram of online registration (message handling) of 
the Internet Store including security risk(s). 
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Figure 8.4 – Mal-activity diagram of online registration (message handling) of the Internet 
Store including security risk(s). 
 
TR7 = From EPC-Impact to Mal-activity  
 Transformation rule seven is based on ID-f. Refers to Impact; e.g. Integrity of 
inquiry message is negated ↔ Spy program is installed silently (integrity is 
negated). MAL-Activity lies on MAL-Swimlane and represents the impact as we 
can see on the example below. EPC-Impact is connected to EPC-Harms which is 
linked to Resource Unit as we can see in Figure 8.3.  
 
 
 
TR8 = From (Risk) Organisation Unit to Mal-Swimlane 
 Transformation rule eight is based on ID-j. Refers to Threat Agent; e.g. Violator ↔ 
Violator (or Spy Program). As we explained during the asset transformations, 
Organisation Unit and Swimlanes act similarly, only difference here is that the 
constructs belongs to Risk and indicates malicious actors (See transformation rule 
1). 
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TR9 = From EPC-Leads to/Negates to Negates 
 Transformation rule nine is based on ID-r1 in Table 8.1. Refers to „Leads to / 
Negates“ relationship; e.g. EPC-Leads to/Negates ↔ Negates. In MAD Negates 
construct initializes at Mal-Activity and linked to MAD-Vulnerability whereas EPC-
Leads to/Negates initializes at EPC-Vulnerability and linked to EPC-Security 
Criterion.  
     
 
 
TR10 = From (Risk) Event + Function + Control Flow to Mal-activity 
 Transformation rule ten is based on ID-k. Refers to Attack Method; e.g. „Violator 
wishes to register to the system“ and „Violator sends inquiry with a spy program“ 
and Control Flow ↔ Violator sends inquiry message and spy program to the 
admin. As we explained earlier, Event, Function and Control Flow of EPC acts like 
an Activity, here only difference from TR3 is that EPC constructs are Risk 
constructs shown in red and MAD construct is Mal-Activity which refers to 
malicious activity (See transformation rule 3).  
 
 
 
TR11 = From (Risk) Resource Unit + Information Flow to ControlFlow  
 Transformation rule eleven is based on ID-k. Refers to Attack Method; e.g. 
„Inquiry message plus Spy program“ and Information Flow ↔ ControlFlow with a 
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message. As we explained earlier, the ControlFlow here also lies in two Swimlanes 
(violator side and admin side) as shown in Figure 8.4. Below example indicates the 
transformation in Risk side (See transformation rule 4).    
 
 
 
 Transformation rule ten is based on ID-c. Refers to IS Asset; e.g. „Inquiry message 
plus Spy program“ and Information Flow ↔ ControlFlow with a message. Below 
example indicates the transformation in IS asset side. 
 
 
 
TR12 = From (Risk) Control Flow to ControlFlow  
Transformation rule twelve is based on ID-r5. Refers to „Targets“ relationship. In EPC, 
Control Flow has another role which covers the relationship between threat and IS asset. 
When the process is flowing from threat to IS asset, Control Flow construct is used as 
target construct. In MAD, ControlFlow construct has the same role when the process is 
flowing from threat Swimlane to IS asset Swimlane.  
 
 
 
TR13 = From (Risk) Assignment to Swimlane contains Mal-Activity  
Transformation rule thirteen is based on ID-r3. Refers to „Uses“ relationship. The 
relationship between threat agent and attack method is defined by Assignment construct 
during the EPC and ISSRM alignment process since the Organisation Unit uses the attack 
method constructs. Similarly, Swimlane containing (uses) Mal-Activity has the same role. 
Following example illustrates the transformation rule, Assignment is the link between 
Function and Organisation Unit. 
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8.3 Risk Treatment-related Transformation 
 
During the risk treatment-related transformations we focus on the constructs and 
relationships which we defined as risk in previous chapters. Risk treatment method and 
security requirements are included in our running example shown in Figure 8.5. The 
difference between previous models is that this time inquiry message is scanned by a 
security system before admin reads it. By the scanning process, threat which is created by 
violator is mitigated. The scenario is illustrated in Figure 8.6 with MAD as well.  
 
Transformation rules for Risk Treatment-related transforming: 
 
TR14 = From EPC-Mitigates (mitigates EPC-Vulnerability) to MitigationLink (mitigates 
ControlFlow) 
 Transformation rule fourteen is based on ID-r2. Refers to „Mitigates“ relationship; 
e.g. Mitigation with EPC-Mitigates from „Message is scanned“ to „Message 
scanning process failed“ ↔ Mitigation with MitigationLink from „Scanning inquiry 
message“ to ControlFlow with a message. In MAD MitigatinLink initializes at 
MitigationActivity and linked to ControlFlow whereas in EPC EPC-Mitigates 
initializes at risk-treatment Function and is linked to EPC-Vulnerability. 
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Figure 8.5 – Security-Oriented EPC diagram of online registration (message handling) of 
the Internet Store including risk treatment. 
 
 
Figure 8.6 – Mal-activity diagram of online registration (message handling) of the Internet 
Store including risk treatment. 
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TR15 = From (RT) Event + Function + Control Flow to MitigationActivity  
 Transformation rule fifteen is based on ID-m. Refers to Security Requirement; e.g. 
„Scanning system activated“ and „Message is scanned“ and Control Flow ↔ 
Scanning inquiry message. As we described the similarity between asset Function, 
Event, Control Flow and Activity earlier, here also similar transformation is 
indicated between risk-treatment Function, Event, Control Flow and 
MitigationActivity (See transformation rule 3 and 10).  
 
 
 
 e.g. „Message is not safe“ and „System blocks the user and deletes the message“ 
and Control Flow ↔ Block user and delete message. Similar example is shown 
below. 
 
 
 
TR16 = From (RT) Logical Operator to Decision 
 Transformation rule sixteen is based on ID-m. Refers to Security Requirement; e.g. 
XOR ↔ decision gate. The Logical Operator in EPC and Decision in MAD are 
simple structured constructs which act as a decision maker according to the flow of 
the process. They both are connected to control flows during the process flow.  
 
 
 
TR17 = From (RT) Organisation Unit to Swimlane 
 Transformation rule seventeen is based on ID-m. Refers to Security Requirement; 
e.g. Security System ↔ Security System (See transformation rule 1 and 8). 
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(Common for Asset, Risk and Risk Treatment concepts) 
TR18 = From Control Flow to ControlFlow 
 Transformation rule eighteen is based on ID-c,k and m. This transformation rule 
belongs to all three concepts defined below. Control flow might just indicate the 
flow of the process, it can be part of Asset, Risk or Risk Treatment as a construct. 
 
 
 
The purpose of transformation from Security-Oriented EPC to MAD is to relate two 
completely different models to each other and provide business analysts different way of 
solution for a given problem in different perspectives. By transformation, we also see in 
which level of security EPC and MAD differs from each other and in which level of 
security they act in same way.     
 
8.4 Summary 
 
We have used the online registration to internet store running example in three different 
levels of ISSRM concepts; Asset-related, Risk-related and Risk Treatment-related. Also we 
have illustrated the Security-Oriented EPC and MAD models in order to identify the 
similarities and transformation rules between Security-Oriented EPC and MAD. In the end, 
we have obtained eighteen transformation rules which refer to the construct 
transformations from Security-Oriented EPC constructs to MAD constructs. Although 
transformation rules are identified and illustrated with models one by one, their 
effectiveness will be controversial until we validate and approve them.     
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Chapter 9. VALIDATION 
 
Validation chapter consists of an introduction to the research area, description of the 
problem statement, detailed experiment planning, operation, presentation of the data 
analysis, interpretation of results and discussions about the findings and the conclusions. 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In validation chapter, we validate our transformation rules which have been generated in 
previous chapter. Validation process is done through a descriptive case study which is a 
test and performed by ten different IT-related people (Project Managers, Software 
Engineers, Electrics and Electronics Engineers).  
 
9.2 Problem Statement  
 
The purpose of the descriptive case study during the validation is to see how a participant 
can understand the transformation rules defined and illustrate the transformation of a given 
model by analysing the concepts and rules. We will now introduce the case study 
experiment planning and analyse each of the solutions performed by the participants and in 
the end discuss which parts of the transformation rules are clear and which are not. 
 
9.3 Experiment Planning 
 
The case study consists of the transformation rules and figures which are shown during the 
Chapter 8. All transformation rules are given with a clear explanation, including the 
Security-Oriented EPC models (Asset, Risk and Risk-treatment levels) of the online 
registration (message handling) of the Internet Store scenario. Only information hidden is 
the Mal-Activity Diagrams of the scenario, in the end of the test the participant is asked to 
draw MAD of Figure 8.5 of Chapter 8 by using the defined transformation rules. The 
answer is already shown in previous chapter with Figure 8.6. To make the test little bit 
easier the MAD of Figure 8.1 of Chapter 8 is given to the participant, the Asset model 
transformation. In particular, we identify and count each transformation rules used in the 
correct solution and we will compare the participant’s solution with the correct one and get 
the percentage of the correctness of the result. Also, if the transformed construct is used in 
inaccurate flow then the rule will be counted as half point, even if the transformed 
construct is accurate itself. In the end we will get the average of these ten results and by 
this method we will validate the transformation rules in statistical test based percentage. 
Although these results will not give us the exact and 100% consistent numbers, we will 
have approximate idea and conclusion about how our transformation rules are successful, 
clear and effective. 
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9.4 Experiment Operation 
 
Security-Oriented EPC model of online registration (message handling) of the Internet 
Store (to be transformed in Figure 9.1) and MAD of the same scenario (the result after 
transformation in Figure 9.2) are illustrated in figures. In the MAD, you can see the stars 
referring each transformed construct including transformation numbers. In total there are 
twenty transformations done by using fourteen different transformation rules, four 
transformation rules are not used in the model and we will discuss the reason during the 
interpretation and conclusion chapters: 
 
1. Transformation rule number one is used (Business Asset-related transformation) 
2. Transformation rule number three is used (Business Asset-related transformation) 
3. Transformation rule number four is used (Business Asset-related transformation) 
4. Transformation rule number five is used (Business Asset-related transformation) 
5. Transformation rule number eight is used (Risk-related transformation) 
6. Transformation rule number ten is used (Risk-related transformation) 
7. Transformation rule number eleven is used (Risk-related transformation) 
8. Transformation rule number twelve is used (Risk-related transformation) 
9. Transformation rule number thirteen is used (Risk-related transformation) 
10. Transformation rule number seventeen is used (Risk Treatment-related 
transformation) 
11. Transformation rule number fifteen is used (Risk Treatment-related transformation) 
12. Transformation rule number sixteen is used (Risk Treatment-related 
transformation) 
13. Transformation rule number fifteen is used (Risk Treatment-related transformation) 
14. Transformation rule number eighteen is used (Common transformation rule) 
15. Transformation rule number eighteen is used (Common transformation rule) 
16. Transformation rule number fourteen is used (Risk Treatment-related 
transformation) 
17. Transformation rule number fourteen is used (Risk Treatment-related 
transformation) 
18. Transformation rule number one is used (Asset-related transformation) 
19. Transformation rule number three is used (Asset-related transformation) 
20. Transformation rule number eighteen is used (Common transformation rule) 
 
Now we can start analyzing the participant’s data by using our result set including twenty 
transformations. Most of the results are similar to the correct solution, however we did not 
expect none of participants complete it 100% correctly. Because some people even did not 
know what MAD is. Also, we have underestimated some mistakes such as unnecessarily 
used constructs and transformations. Besides, some drawings look different than each other 
since different tools are used by participants. 
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Figure 9.1 – Security-Oriented EPC diagram of online registration (message handling) of 
the Internet Store. 
 
 
Figure 9.2 – Mal-activity Diagram of online registration (message handling) of the Internet 
Store, including identified stars for transformed constructs. 
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9.5 Data Analysis 
 
Participant 1: 
 
In Figure 9.3 the solution of Participant 1 is illustrated. Except 17th and 20th 
transformations, all transformations are used perfectly. Participant 1 forgot to use the 
mitigation link to the inquiry message coming from user side. The security system does not 
know if the message includes spy program or not, in this case scanning function mitigates 
all potential incoming messages. Also, Participant 1 forgot to use the last control flow after 
admin reads the message, however it is not very necessary detail. In conclusion, 18 over 20 
of transformations are correct and success percentage of Participant 1 is 90%. 
 
 
Figure 9.3 – Solution of Participant 1. 
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Participant 2:     
 
In Figure 9.4 the solution of Participant 2 is illustrated. Participant 2 also managed to 
transform all constructs except 17th and 20th transformations. Participant 2 forgot to use the 
mitigation link to the inquiry message coming from user side and also forgot to use the last 
control flow after admin reads the message, however it is not very necessary absence. In 
conclusion, 18 over 20 of transformations are correct and success percentage of Participant 
2 is 90% as well. 
 
 
Figure 9.4 – Solution of Participant 2. 
 
Participant 3: 
 
In Figure 9.5 the solution of Participant 3 is illustrated. Participant 3 did not use 16th and 
17th transformations which represent mitigation link. It seems he did not understand the 
mitigation process and how it works. Also, he used wrong color in 6th transformation, he 
should have used black color when he was representing the mal-activity. During the 7th 
transformation he should have ended the inquiry message control flow in decision gate, not 
in mitigation activity. Lastly, 3rd transformation should have ended in gate, not in admin 
function. In conclusion, correct transformations number of Participant 3 is 16,5 and his 
success percentage is 83%. 
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Figure 9.5 – Solution of Participant 3. 
 
Participant 4: 
 
In Figure 9.6 solution of Participant 4 is illustrated. Participant 4 did not use the 
transformation number 3, 4, 7, 8, 16 and 17. Transformation number 3 and 4 represents 
inquiry message which initializes at user activity and ends at security system decision gate, 
Participant 4 just indicated the communications through the swimlanes. The same issue 
happened in the inquiry message and spy program on 7th and 8th transformations. Also, 
Participant 4 skipped using mitigation links where he was supposed to transform at 16th 
and 17th transformations. He used wrong color during the 6th transformation (mal-activity 
was supposed to be black color) and wrong arrow type during the 15th transformation 
(control flow should not be a dashed arrow). Correct transformation number of Participant 
4 is 13 and his success percentage is 65%. 
 
Participant 5: 
 
In Figure 9.7 solution of Participant 5 is illustrated. 3rd transformation ends in wrong place 
and it is wrong messaging type as well. The inquiry message coming from user side should 
not include spy program, and also inquiry message control flow should have ended at 
security system decision gate, not at violator function. Participant 5 have used wrong color 
during the 6th transformation, (mal-activity should have been in black color). Also, during 
the 7th transformation message on the control flow coming from the violator is missing. 
Participant 5 did not use transformation number 16 and 20 as well. Mitigation link is used 
only once to the inquiry message coming from user, whereas it should have been used for 
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the control flow coming from violator as well. Correct transformation number of 
Participant 5 is 16 and his success percentage is 80%. 
 
 
Figure 9.6 – Solution of Participant 4. 
 
 
Figure 9.7 – Solution of Participant 5. 
 
102 
 
Participant 6: 
 
In Figure 9.8 the solution of Participant 6 is illustrated. Participant 6 did not use the 
transformation number 16, 17 and 20. 16th and 17th transformations represent mitigation 
link, and 20th transformation represents control flow, however 20th transformation is not 
very critical and just tests the attention of the participant during the experiment. In 
conclusion, correct transformation number of Participant 6 is 17 and his success percentage 
is 85%. 
 
 
Figure 9.8 – Solution of Participant 6. 
 
Participant 7: 
 
In Figure 9.9 the solution of Participant 7 is illustrated. In his solution, 3rd and 7th 
transformations end in wrong place, control flows coming from user and violator should 
have ended at security system decision gate, not at security system mitigation activity. 
Also, wrong positioning is used during the 16th transformation, mitigation link initializes 
correctly at mitigation activity but ends incorrectly at vulnerability which is unnecessary 
construct in this model. 16th transformation should have ended at inquiry message and spy 
program control flow coming from violator. Also 17th transformation is missing, the other 
mitigation link which is supposed to link the inquiry message coming from user. Lastly, 
wrong color is used during the 19th transformation, it should have the same color with 
transformation number 2, which is white. In conclusion, correct transformation number of 
Participant 7 is 17 and his success percentage is 85%. 
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Figure 9.9 – Solution of Participant 7. 
 
Participant 8: 
 
In Figure 9.10 solution of Participant 8 is illustrated. Participant 8 has used wrong type of 
arrow during the 3rd and 4th transformations, control flow should not be a dashed arrow. 
Also he used wrong color (white, instead of black) during the 6th transformation when he 
was indicating mal-activity. During the 7th and 8th transformations, wrong positioning and 
also wrong arrow type (dashed) are used. Therefore, during the 15th transformation wrong 
arrow type (dashed) is used. So far Participant 8 is the only one who has used both 
mitigation links (16th and 17th transformations), but he used wrong color (black instead of 
green). Correct transformation number of Participant 8 is 16 and his success percentage is 
80%. 
 
Participant 9: 
 
In Figure 9.11 the solution of Participant 9 is illustrated. Participant 9 made a mistake 
during the 3rd and 7th transformations, they both should have ended at security system 
decision gate, not at security system mitigation activity. Also, 16th transformation has 
wrong initialization, it should have initialized from the scanning mitigation activity. 
Participant 9 did not use 17th transformation which is the other mitigation link. Also 20th 
transformation is missing. In conclusion, correct transformation number of Participant 9 is 
16,5 and his success percentage is 83%. 
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Figure 9.10 – Solution of Participant 8. 
 
 
Figure 9.11 – Solution of Participant 9. 
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Participant 10: 
 
In Figure 9.12 the solution of Participant 10 is illustrated. In Participant 10’s solution, 3rd 
and 7th transformations (control flows coming from user and violator) end at wrong place, 
as many other participants made the same mistake. 16th transformation (mitigation link to 
control flow of violator) is missing, transformation number 17 (mitigation link to control 
flow of user) is used with wrong positioning, it should have ended at control flow of user. 
Lastly, 20th transformation is missing. Correct transformation number of Participant 10 is 
16,5 and his success percentage is 83%.  
 
 
Figure 9.12 – Solution of Participant 10. 
 
9.6 Interpretation of Results 
 
If we calculate the average success rate of the case study participants: 
 
Total Success Percentage = (90% + 90% + 83% + 65% + 80% + 85% + 85% + 80% +  
          83% + 83%)/10  
       
Total Success Percentage = 83% 
 
Total success percentage is based on twenty tranformations done in the case study model, 
however in total fourteen of eighteen transformation rules are used in the solution. The 
transformation rules which are not used in the solution are; TR2 (Security Criterion), TR6 
(Vulnerability), TR7 (Impact) and TR9 (Negates). The main reasons why these 
transformations are not used is the difference between EPC and MAD abstract syntaxes in 
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the solution phase. In EPC, we can show the process in more sophisticated way, however, 
in MAD, the process is considered in more simple way. For example, security criterion 
(TR2) is not used because after the risk treatment process spy program is not installed 
which means there is no negation (TR9) to the security criterion, and no vulnerability 
(TR6) any more in the system. As a result there is no impact (TR7) too. In Security-
Oriented EPC, in Figure 9.1, we showed these constructs because we have done the 
alignment with ISSRM and it worthed to illustrate all the constructs together in a single 
model; Risk-treatment model. However we do not need to show all the constructs in one 
model during MAD design since we did not align MAD and ISSRM with our running 
example and that is why we ignore unnecessary constructs during the design of 
corresponding concept level (e.g. during the risk-treatment analysis we ignore the risk or 
asset constructs which are not part of the process flow anymore).  
 
Besides, in this manner, it is possible to point “inadequate preoperational explication of 
constructs” threat since the participants had lack of information about the background of 
the whole research that is why they just tried to transform each construct. Another threat 
during the validation was “interaction of history and treatment”, which means that our 
experiment is conducted on a time which affected the results. Some participants were 
complaining that they could not spend enough time to create the solution due to their 
personal occupation.    
   
9.7 Summary 
 
All in all, it is possible to say that the success percentage of our experiment based on 
transformation rules defined in Chapter 8 is approximately 80% which is a satisfying 
result. 
 
Table 9.1 – Statistics of the participants’ results based on transformations. 
Participant Missing 
transformation 
Incorrectly used 
transformation 
Participant 1 17, 20 - 
Participant 2 17, 20 - 
Participant 3 16, 17 3, 6 ,7 
Participant 4 3, 4, 7, 8, 16, 17 6, 15 
Participant 5 7, 16, 20 3, 6 
Participant 6 16, 17, 20 - 
Participant 7 17 3, 7, 16, 19 
Participant 8 - 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17 
Participant 9 17, 20 3, 7, 16 
Participant 10 16, 20 3, 7, 17 
 
Now let’s focus on fourteen transformation rules which are included in the case study 
model. All the participants have made mistakes, some are similar and some are different. 
Table 9.1 indicates the statistics of the missing and incorrectly used transformations. 
 
According to Table 9.1, occurencies of the missing transformations can be listed in 
descending order as; 17 (TR14 – 7 times), 20 (TR18 – 6 times), 16 (TR14 – 5 times), 7 
(TR11 – 2 times), 3 (TR4), 4 (TR5) and 8 (TR12 – 1 times). Basically, participants mainly 
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forgot to use transformation rule number 14 and 18. We can underestimate the absence of 
18th transformation rule since it just indicates a usual control flow at the end of our 
scenario. However, 14th transformation rule is very important because it indicates the 
mitigation link during the risk treatment process. We assume this absence happened due to 
the difference of the abstract syntax of the modeling languages in risk treatment level, 
however, in definition of TR14 in Chapter 9 the differences are defined. In conclusion, ten 
participants have clearly used TR1, TR3, TR8, TR10, TR13, TR15, TR16 and TR17, 
which gives us the success ratio of 8/14. However, single transformation rule based 
analysis is not very efficient since we have ten different participants and if each participant 
skips only one but different transformation rules than each other, our success ratio would 
be 4:14, whereas the total success percentage would be 95%. That is why we consider the 
whole model during the decision of success percentage.   
 
Occurencies of the incorrectly used transformations can be listed in descending order as; 3 
(TR4 – 6 times), 7 (TR11 – 5 times), 6 (TR10 – 4 times), 16 (TR14 – 3 times), 15 (TR18) 
and 17 (TR14 – 2 times), 4 (TR5), 8 (TR12) and 19 (TR3 – 1 time). To make conclusion 
about incorrectly usage of transformation rules is more complex than to make conclusion 
about missing transformation rules, because incorrectly does not mean a specific mistake, 
various types of mistakes can be done by the participants such as using wrong color, using 
wrong initialize or end and so on. In particular, we can assume that participants made 
wrong linking during the 4th and 11th transformation rules since it is perfectly normal to use 
the control flow incorrectly during the process flow (e.g. ending at activity instead of 
decision gate or not writing the message on the control flow). 10th transformation rule 
mistake is obviously clear since many participants forgot to use black color when using 
malicious activity. And lastly, some mitigation links are used incorrectly during the usage 
of 14th transformation rule. 
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Chapter 10. CONCLUSION 
 
We divide conclusion chapter into four parts; short summarize of the thesis, limitations of 
the thesis, conclusions of the thesis and future work. Conclusions section states the 
contributions between recalled chapter and the research question of the thesis. 
 
10.1 Summary 
 
In this thesis, after required knowledge is provided in state of art chapters, the alignment 
between EPC and ISSRM is performed by using security risk modeling methods. The 
background information about business process modeling languages, security modeling 
languages and ISSRM are given in order to let reader understand and have the ability to 
compare the languages and concepts between each other in security requirements level. 
During the alignment process, in Chapter 5, EPC language is analysed in six different 
steps; Context and Asset Identification, Determination of Security Objectives, Risk 
Analysis and Assessment, Risk Treatment, Security Requirements Definition and Control 
Selection and Implementation. Later, extensions to EPC are done and the extended 
language is called as Security-Oriented EPC. To relate the extensions of EPC with real life, 
in Chapter 7, a running example with metric values is illustrated by measuring security 
risks of Security-Oriented EPC. In the end of the measurement analysis, we have obtained 
approximate ROSI of Security-Oriented EPC. Later, in order to test and emphasize the 
availability and adaptability of Security-Oriented EPC, we have defined set of 
transformation rules from Security-Oriented EPC to Mal-Activity Diagrams in Chapter 8. 
In the end, in Chapter 9, we have validated the transformation rules by a descriptive case 
study.    
 
10.2 Limitations 
 
Although the research in this thesis has reached its aims, there were some unavoidable 
limitations. First, because of the time limit, limited (ten participants in total) participants 
have involved during the validation of thesis. Therefore, to generalize the results for larger 
groups, validation case study should have involved more participants in at different levels. 
Also, another limitation was the lack of various resources on Information System Security 
Risk Management method. Almost all the resources which are used in this thesis as a 
reference are created by same authors. Another limitation is that we have used a single 
running example in order to illustrate different modeling language examples parallel to 
each other.          
 
 
 
110 
 
10.3 Conclusions 
 
The main conclusion of giving background information in this thesis is instructing the 
reader for the further analysis and understanding the research question and the theory 
better. In Chapter 2, after analyzing business process modeling languages, we conclude 
that EPC is not effective to elicit security concerns and we decided to align it with ISSRM. 
Conclusion of Chapter 3 is that MAD is the most suitable language to use during the 
transformation and validation of the extended EPC since the alignment between MAD and 
ISSRM showed us that MAD is an effective security-oriented modeling language. In 
Chapter 4, we conclude that the risk management process with ISSRM is the way to align 
and extend EPC.   
 
The main contribution of the alignment process is making EPC more secured against 
potential risks and vulnerable attacks. Although EPC is serving its primary purpose at the 
high-degree, it is not helpful to elicit security concerns when developing information 
enterprise systems. In the end of the alignment process with a running example, we have 
obtained an alignment table between EPC and ISSRM. By obtaining alignment table, we 
had a chance to see the security needs of the EPC language in corresponding levels; Asset, 
Risk, or Risk Treatment. This conclusion helped us during the analysis of the extension of 
the EPC language. Besides, conclusion of the alignment process is the answer of our 
research question “How EPC could be extended to support security risk management?”. 
Alignment of EPC led us to extend language in high and low construct levels according to 
security needs and requirements.  
 
In Chapter 6, the extensions on EPC language are done in two different ways; High Level 
with Process Paths and Low Level with other language constructs which can be contained 
by Process Path during the modeling. Such method is chosen in order to emphasize the 
sophistication of EPC and also to reduce the complexity optionally (complexity reduction 
might be helpful during the future work). As a conclusion of extensions, we have 
developed syntactic, semantic and methodological extensions to EPC that would support 
modeling security risks and their countermeasures. Besides, extensions will help business 
analysts to see the business model in different levels of security, this answers the second 
research question “What is the benefit of such extension?”. Another conclusion of the 
extension process is that we have obtained guidelines to use Security-Oriented EPC. This 
conclusion is answering both research questions as well. 
 
The conclusion of the ROSI analysis is answering the question of the research questions in 
such a way that a business analyst can understand the purpose better by estimating the cost 
of using Security-Oriented EPC. Also, we can conclude that extended EPC helps to 
measure the risks, because, by the ROSI calculation we have analysed the cost with a 
security requirement definition and the system got return on investment the percentage of 
167. 
 
During the state of art when we analysed the MAD with ISSRM, we have pointed that 
MAD is a suitable language to measure security needs and requirements of a model. This 
consequence helped us to define many transformation rules from Security-Oriented EPC to 
MAD easily. Regarding our research question “What is the benefit of such extension?”, we 
can say that one of the benefits is obtaining a lot of transformation rules and a common 
alignment table between ISSRM, Security-Oriented EPC and MAD. 
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Conclusion of the case study experiment contributes the previous work and research 
question by proving the effectiveness, validity and coordination of the Security-Oriented 
EPC language.        
 
10.4 Future Work 
 
Regarding future work, we can discuss what the next steps could be and if we think that 
certain paths seem to be more promising than others or they do not. 
  
The next step could be the implementation of the Security-Oriented EPC language in a 
modeling tool and let an organisation to use it during a business process modeling of a 
sophisticated problem which contains security needs. By this method we could see the 
efficiency of our work in real life in a more realistic way. Besides, another step could be 
analyzing the EPC and ISSRM alignment with a less or more complicated running 
example. 
 
In this thesis, each analysis is planned and contribution is done several times from different 
perspectives. As a result, we can’t identify certain paths which seem to be more promising 
than others.      
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RESÜMEE 
 
Event-driven Process Chaini  laiendused ja rakendus Infosüsteemi 
Turberiskihalduseks 
 
Turvatehnika konstrueerimine on üks suuremaid murekohti süsteemi arenduses ja sellele 
tuleks tähelepanu pöörata kogu arendusprotsessi jooksul. Turvaliseks modelleerimiseks on 
mitmeid erinevaid keeli, mis aitavad hallata turvariske juba nõuete staadiumis. Käesolevas 
töös keskendutakse esmalt Event-driven Process Chain (EPC)-le, mida kasutatakse 
äriprotsesside modelleerimisel. Täpsemalt öeldes uuritakse, kuidas antud keel toetab 
infosüsteemi  turberiskihaldust (ISSRM). Uurimuse eesmärk on välja selgitada EPC jaoks 
vajalikud turbenõuded. Nende tulemusena saame vastavustabeli EPC konstruktsioonide ja 
ISSRM domeeni mudeli kontseptide vahel. Järgnevalt laiendame EPC keelt ja selle 
konstruktsioone EPC ja ISSRM vastavustabeli seostega. Tekkinud laiendatud keelt 
kutsume “Security-Oriented EPC”. Laiendatud modelleerimiskeel sisaldab uut 
konstruktsioonide kogumikku, mis viitab ISSRM kontseptidele. Olles selgitanud 
turvanõuete  olulisust varajases arendusstaadiumis, esitleme töötluse suunised, et viia ellu 
tõlked Security-Oriented EPC ja Mal-Activity Diagrams (MAD) vahel. Meie ettepanek 
põhineb EPC keele süstemaatiliste ja maandatud laiendustel ja selle  vastastikusest 
sõltuvusest ISSRM domeeni mudelisse.  Vastavuses olevad tulemused aitavad 
ärianalüütikutel mõista, kuidas modelleerida turvariske süsteemi nõuete ja disainimise 
staadiumites. Lisaks annavad töötluse tulemused võimaluse koostööks erinevate 
modelleerimiskeelte vahel, mida analüüsitakse kasutades sama kontseptuaalset 
raamistikku.  
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